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IRRELEVANCE OF BOURGEOIS ECONOMICS

PAUL M. SWEEZY

THE MOROCCAN CRISIS

JAMES A. PAUL

Black Women in Revolt

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NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

MR subscribers received the annual Monthly Review Associates appeal letter around the middle of September, and while it is too early to attempt to project trends we are glad to report that returns during the first few days were good to excellent. Any readers who buy their magazines at newsstands can receive a copy of the letter by sending us their names and addresses. For the benefit of any who may not already know, the primary purpose of the Associates is to cover the magazine's deficit. But those who join also get important benefits: the right to buy copies for personal use of all MR Press books at 50 percent off list price, a year's subscription (new or renewal), and a free book (this year it is Pierre Vallières' *White Niggers of America*, list price $7.50). Membership fees in the Associates begin at $25, with many readers contributing more. (If you already have *White Niggers*, you can donate your free Associates copy to the Prisoners Fund, i.e., for free distribution to inmates of U.S. prisons. Unfortunately, the Associates cannot substitute other books for the free one offered with the appeal letter.)

The excerpt from the statement of purposes of the Red Prison Movement which appears on p. 64 was originally intended to appear immediately after "Black Women in Revolt" (pp. 45-56), but makeup problems prevented. This is still where it belongs, however.

Our extensive correspondence with prisoners contains a great deal that could usefully be passed along to all MR readers, and we will try from time

(*Continued on inside back cover*)

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ON THE IRRELEVANCE OF BOURGEOIS ECONOMICS

By Paul M. Sweezy

The following pieces were written for professional economic journals but with MONTHLY REVIEW readers very much in mind, since we consider it to be one of MR's primary tasks to present an ongoing critique of the bourgeois social sciences. They are published here by agreement with the editors concerned. The first is part of a symposium appearing in the current (November) issue of the *Quarterly Journal of Economics* dealing with the recently published book, *The Political Economy of the New Left,* by Assar Lindbeck. The other participants in the symposium were G. L. Bach, Stephen Hymer and Frank Roosevelt, and Lindbeck himself. The QJE is published by the Harvard economics department.

The second piece is appearing in the fall issue of the *Intermountain Economic Review,* published by the economics department of the University of Utah, Salt Lake City. In its spring 1972 issue, the IER reprinted my article "Socio-Cultural Transformation in Developing Countries" (see *Modern Capitalism and Other Essays,* Monthly Review Press, 1972, pp. 15-24), along with a comment, "Some Notes on a Radical's View of the Development Process in the Third World," by Charles T. Nisbet, of the economics faculty of Evergreen State College in Washington state. The second piece below is a reply to Nisbet.—P.M.S.

ON LINDBECK'S "POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW LEFT"

The New Left/Old Left dichotomy from which Lindbeck starts seems to me more misleading than helpful, and in fact he is able to maintain it only by a strategem of dubious validity. He prudently refrains from attempting to provide a definition of either kind of Left, but in order to write about the New Left he is obliged to select certain writers as spokesmen or, as he says in one place (p. 53), "inspirers" of the movement whose views can be cited and criticized. Who are they? Thumbing

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back through the text and footnotes, I find the following names, most of them occurring more than once and some rather frequently: Herbert Marcuse, Harry Magdoff, Andre Gunder Frank, Ernest Mandel, Baran and Sweezy (separately and in combination), André Gorz, Leo Huberman, and (with reservations) John Kenneth Galbraith.

Now, whatever else these people may or may not be, they are certainly not in any sense "new." Quite a few have been identified with the Left for 35 years or more, and every one of them had a pretty well defined political identity long before there was anything called the New Left. How does it happen that they now appear as ideologists of a movement which probably everyone would agree dates from the second half of the 1960s? This is a question which Lindbeck never raises, quite possibly because it never occurred to him. And yet the answer is neither obscure nor unimportant for his critique.

What these writers—apart from Galbraith, of course, who is a special case and is treated as such by Lindbeck too—and at least parts of the New Left have in common is a total rejection of the whole capitalist/imperialist system and a profound lack of interest in schemes or efforts to reform it (except as they may be related to revolutionary tactics). They both also see the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites as class societies increasingly indistinguishable from their capitalist counterparts and hence capable of teaching only negative lessons. On the many other matters—theoretical analysis, strategy and tactics, the nature of a good society—these writers differ greatly among themselves, as indeed do the New Leftists. Nevertheless, the points of convergence are undoubtedly important and provide a plausible basis for treating this particular group of "old" leftists as spokesmen for the New Left. Only it should be clear that what is involved here is not really an old/new dichotomy but rather a radical/reformist dichotomy which is certainly as old as the modern socialist movement and which exists in every generation. It comes to the fore now because the generation of leftists which emerged on the scene in the later 1960s was heavily weighted on the radical side.

Up to this point I have provided a sort of rationale for

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Lindbeck's methodology. Let me hasten to add, however, that this is all very unfortunate for Lindbeck because while he is committed to discussing the radical position, he is singularly ill-equipped to do so. He has no empathy for the radical position; his view of history and the historic process is totally different; and his understanding of Marxism, the only coherent intellectual tradition to which the radical Left can relate, is exactly what one would expect of a very conventional neoclassical economist, i.e., superficial to the point of nonexistence. The result is that, while to Paul Samuelson (see his Foreword) and perhaps to most of the rest of Lindbeck's professional colleagues the book is fresh and stimulating, I as a radical find it as irrelevant and boring as most neoclassical economics.

The biggest difference between Lindbeck and us is that we see two totally different realities. He has the typical liberal-reformist view of history as essentially a series of accidents: nothing had to happen the way it did, and from now on anything can happen. The future is therefore a kind of smorgasbord offering all the dishes in the liberal cookbook from which "we" can choose those which most appeal to us. War and violence and revolution are very costly in human lives and suffering, so "we" naturally reject them. It is better to take what there is, imperfect though it may be, and fix it up in accordance with the tried-and-true principles of consumer sovereignty, competition (*any* kind of competition will do, see p. 79), profit maximization, etc., etc., interfering here and there to get some of the things this system doesn't provide, like more equality and more public goods and services. As far as the relations between developed and underdeveloped countries are concerned, the problem is not exploitation or anything like that but rather a natural tendency of the big and the strong to dominate the small and the weak. Here, as at various other points of his argument, Lindbeck brings in the Soviet Union which, since it also qualifies as an imperialist country, "proves" that imperialism has nothing to do with capitalism or socialism. (He might at least have the grace to say, maybe in a footnote, that so far at any rate the Soviet Union has refrained from dropping napalm on backward countries halfway around the world out of "long-

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term considerations of national security," which he considers to be "maybe the crucial consideration" determining the foreign policy of the big powers. [p. 63])

The radical view of the world is of course entirely different. We see the present as the frightful outcome of some four centuries of the history of capitalism, a system the very heart of which is exploitation and inequality and which is now careening out of control toward its final crises and catastrophes. Wars and revolutions are not a matter of preference or choice: they are the inevitable outcome of capitalism's inner contradictions, and the question is not whether they will happen but whether they will finally do away with the system which breeds them. To speak of reforming capitalism is either naiveté or deception. Wealth, privilege, and power go together and belong to a class which will fight to the end to preserve its monopoly over them, allowing only such reforms and freedom to reformers as it deems to be in its own interest. As for the Soviet Union, it is the prodact of a genuine anti-capitalist revolution but one which, for reasons which are only beginning to be properly understood, was unable to carry through to a nonexploitative, classless society. It is therefore, once again, naiveté or deception to cite the Soviet Union to prove anything about socialism: it is not a socialist society and, even more important, it is not moving toward socialism but away from it. (I might add, speaking for myself and what I believe is a growing proportion of the radical Left, that the lessons of Soviet experience have not been lost on the world revolutionary movement and that, partly as a result of these lessons, China has been able to move, not without setbacks and retreats, toward socialism and has already created a society radically different from capitalism.)

I do not of course expect Lindbeck to accept or even understand this radical view of reality. From his standpoint it is probably either ridiculous or nonsensical, and nothing I can say is likely to induce him to change his mind. If this is so, however, the question inevitably arises as to what value or importance Lindbeck can possibly have as a critic of the radical Left. And the answer is the obvious one: very little, if any.

There is another way of looking at Lindbeck's book, i.e.

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as the informal commentary of a more or less typical neoclassical economist on a wide range of problems which he thinks are important. (From this point of view, the fact that he thinks the radical Left must also think them important and hence must entertain views about them which can reasonably be compared with his own can be ignored.) In other words, Lindbeck's book could easily provide a convenient starting point for a critique not of the radical Left but of neoclassical economics. I do not aspire to anything so ambitious and will therefore confine the remainder of these remarks to a couple of topics on which lack of clarity seems particularly prevalent.

There is first the whole question of the formation and role of consumer preferences. For a long time the standard, if seldom articulated, view of bourgeois economics was that the wants and preferences of consumers are an emanation of human nature, rising in an endless ladder from the simplest requirements for food, clothing, and shelter to the demands of the educated sensibility for all the refinements and luxuries of advanced civilization. At every income level, needs and wants are identical and universally shared. It follows automatically that, apart from the distribution of income about which legitimate differences of opinion may exist, and apart from the provision of goods and services which can only be consumed collectively, it is absolutely impossible to make out a rational case against allowing consumer preferences to play the dominant role in determining the allocation of resources and the composition of social output. Precisely when this view was first challenged I do not know, but it certainly came under what may be called preliminary questioning as early as Pigou's pioneering work in welfare economics; and in recent years it has been subjected to concerted attack from several quarters (latter-day muckrakers like Vance Packard, Galbraith, etc.). The argument of these bourgeois iconoclasts of course is that consumer preferences are manipulated by monopolistic advertisers and salesmen and that wants therefore no longer reflect true needs, and the whole rationale of "consumer sovereignty" is therefore exploded.

The orthodox response to this line of argument has usually been to admit that there is some truth to it but not enough

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to invalidate the underlying case for respecting consumer preferences. It is true that people do not need chrome-covered cars with new models every year, but they do need cars; and, as the failure of the Edsel and the growing popularity of imported economy cars show, there are limits to their manipulatability. Excesses thus tend to produce their own correctives, and the total social costs involved are not all that great anyway.

If the debate is confined to this level, it seems to me that the orthodox clearly have the better of it. But from the radical point of view these arguments and counter-arguments do not even scratch the surface of the problem. What is this need for cars?* It is real enough, no doubt about that. According to a Gallup survey, 81 percent of American workers travel to and from work by automobile. (*New York Times,* May 30, 1971) Most of them couldn't get there any other way, so their need for cars is as real as their need for jobs. But is this a need which emanates from human nature, or is it a need which has been created by a certain kind of society? The answer of course is obvious. It follows that the question to ask about cars is not whether the consumer is manipulated into buying one kind or another, but whether a society which makes it necessary to have a car in order to get to work makes any sense. Note that what is at issue here is not only the mode of transportation but, even more important, a locational pattern which implies the universal separation of residence and work. Not only is this pattern of separation a very recent phenomenon historically, but also it exists in this extreme form only in the United States. (The Gallup survey referred to above found that in West Germany, the second most car-using country of seven investigated, only 45 percent of workers travel by car while 22 percent, as compared to only 6 percent in the United States, walk to work.)

Presented with information of this kind, an orthodox neoclassical economist could be expected to react in several ways. In the first place, he will probably see car-use as an index of

* I take the case of cars because it is a particularly striking one, but the analysis applies, *mutatis mutandis,* to the whole range of wants and needs.

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"modernization," definitely a good thing in his book. That the United States is ahead of the others demonstrates that it is the most modern and shows them the shape of their own future. If you suggest to him that some countries may not want to follow this course, he will disagree with you and point to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as proof that the desire to possess automobiles is so strong that no government can long resist it. It is not that this desire emanates from human nature, he will explain in anticipation of a possible objection, but simply that the technology of automotive transport exists and people will insist on benefiting from it. (At bottom your neoclassical economist is very much a technological determinist, though he is so little aware of it that he is given to [wrongly] condemning Marxism for allegedly subscribing to a doctrine of technological determinism.) If you point out that the "benefits" of automobilization on the U.S. scale include such things as urban decay and breakdown, growing and perhaps irreversible destruction of land and pollution of air, and much else that most reasonable people don't consider particularly beneficial, he will probably launch into a discussion of externalities and how to deal with them through taxation and subsidies (in this case he might suggest taxation of urban car-use and subsidization of public transportation). If you express skepticism on the ground, among others, that the automobile-industrial complex seems to have an awful lot of power, he will admit that you have a point but will quickly dismiss it with the admonition that the real trouble is not so much the power of special interests as the apathy of the public. And if you finally explode with some such statement as that the whole rotten system is nothing but an externality of profit-making and capital-accumulating, he will be confirmed in his original suspicion that you are a nut who is incapable of understanding the objective and value-free science of economics. You will not, alas, have reached a meeting of the minds, but at least you will have temporarily succeeded in lifting the discussion of the needs, wants, and preferences of consumers above the level of banalities and trivialities on which it usually moves.

A final matter on which I would like to comment is the

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neoclassical economist's worship of innovation. Lindbeck reflects this attitude in a number of passages, but nowhere more explicitly than in connection with "market socialism":

> A . . . *specific* problem for socialist market economies seems to be designing ways for individuals to take *new* initiatives (such as the development of new products, new firms, and new production techniques) when private ownership in the sphere of production is not permitted.
>
> If only those who have succeeded in reaching the top levels of the prevailing hierarchies are allowed to take initiative, is it not likely that initiative will be hampered? . . . It is not obvious that such problems can be avoided in a less hierarchical system of organizations *within* firms (for instance, with voting rights and majority decision-making for all employees). In this case too, it may be difficult to launch new ventures if on every occasion the majority has to be convinced that a new product is worth producing and a new method of production worth applying. Another complication is the difficulty of convincing the majority in a firm that a plant should be moved to another region or possibly be closed down completely. (pp. 67-68)

Quite apart from arguments about whether this or that arrangement is conducive to various forms of innovation in products and methods of production, what is conspicuously absent here, and throughout neoclassical economics, is any reasoned support for the view that innovation in these areas is a highly desirable characteristic of any economic system. This is simply taken for granted as self-evident. To me, and I would suppose to many others not already bemused by the tenets of economic orthodoxy, it is anything but self-evident. Why wouldn't it be preferable to develop good products (functional, aesthetically attractive, durable) and methods of production compatible with humanized labor processes and then stick to them until or unless some rational reason for change is persuasively offered? In other words why not a presumption *against* rather than *for* innovation as such? As for Lindbeck's "difficulty of convincing the majority in a firm that a plant should be moved to another region or possibly be closed down altogether," I would ask why assume that production must always be organized in firms or plants which can be moved or closed down? Why not in communes which are social and political as well

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as economic units, which are located in a certain place because they are part of the whole lives of their members, and which it would never occur to anyone to close down?

I think I know the answer to these questions. It is that innovation is good for the capitalist economy: it creates obsolescence, stimulates new demand, opens additional outlets for capital investment, all of which tend to sustain effective demand and profits. And of course capitalist enterprises have to be organized in such a way that they can be moved or closed down in case they incur losses, or more profitable opportunities are available elsewhere. The same considerations hold for market "socialism" which in reality is only a somewhat different form of capitalism. Moreover, it is only natural that neoclassical economists should work on the principle that "what is good for capitalism is good." I only wish that they could achieve enough self-understanding to admit that this *is* their principle and to proclaim it as openly as we radicals proclaim the opposite.

REPLY TO CHARLES T. NISBET

First, Nisbet finds that the development experience of most Third World countries since the Second World War has been quite favorable and cites Gross Domestic Product growth rates in support. At the same time, however, he appends a footnote which says:

> We are cautioned that GDP is not necessarily an index of human welfare and that it is subject to an array of weaknesses especially when used for international comparisons. Be that as it may, we are forced to come up with some index of growth and development and GNP and GDP are the best we have found to date.

My answer to this is that we are most certainly *not* forced to come up with some index of growth, let alone an index of growth *and* development; and that only orthodox economists

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could now, in the 1970s, continue to insist that GNP/GDP is the best we have for *any* purpose. If we want indications (not an index) of real development, we should look at such matters as infant mortality, disease rates, nutritional levels, tendencies to equality or inequality, poverty, participation by people in shaping their own destinies, literacy, etc., etc. And by all these standards, the record of the Third World countries, even those with the fastest growing GDPs, has been abysmal. In contrast, China which is still a poor country and does not publish (or presumably even calculate) GDP figures, has had a record of solid and in some respects sensational progress. Mr. Nisbet should ponder a statement (reported in the *New York Times* of December 8, 1971) by Emilio Medici, President of Brazil, the newest GDP-miracle country (more than 11 percent growth in 1971): "The economy's doing fine, but the people are not."

Second, Nisbet misrepresents my position when he writes: "Sweezy argues that present-day developed countries achieved their status at the expense of 'subjugating, plundering, and exploiting foreign countries and territories' (the present-day underdeveloped countries)." Let me quote exactly what I did say:

> From the very beginning, capitalism advanced by subjugating, plundering, and exploiting foreign countries and territories. The result was to transfer wealth from the periphery to the metropolis —on the one hand destroying the old society in the periphery and reorganizing it as a dependent satellite, and on the other hand concentrating the resources necessary for the "take-off" in the metropolis. This process has been repeated again and again, and for many centuries always on a larger and larger scale.

It will be seen that I do not at all deny the reality of the take-off, nor is there any implication that the capitalist development process in the metropolitan countries has not been the principal factor responsible for their status today. What I do claim is that the plunder of the Third World was crucial in getting the process started. A historical generalization of this kind cannot be "proved" in the way that a mathematical theorem can, but there is an enormous amount of evidence which supports it, in the sense that the evidence is consistent with the

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generalization and would be difficult if not impossible to explain in any other way. If Mr. Nisbet doesn't know any of this evidence, I suspect that the fault lies in his training as a neoclassical economist. If he wishes to acquaint himself with some of it, he could well start with the last part of Volume I of *Capital* ("The So-called Primitive Accumulation"), and from there he might go on to such books as Eric Williams' *Capitalism and Slavery* and R. Palme Dutt's *India Today*.

Finally, Nisbet chides Baran and me for drawing conclusions from a comparison of figures on net capital exports of U.S. corporations and remittances to U.S. corporations from their foreign subsidiaries. We argued in *Monopoly Capital* that the fact that the remittances regularly exceed the capital exports by a wide margin means that "foreign investment, far from being an outlet for domestically generated surplus, is a most efficient device for transferring surplus generated abroad to the investing country." Since others have likewise taken exception to this line of reasoning, it may be well to examine Nisbet's attempted refutation in some detail. He advances four arguments:

> First, a comparison of direct investment income remitted against net capital outflows has little meaning except in the limited context of the U.S. balance of payments and certainly does not in any way measure the net value of foreign investment.

The answer to this is that we—and, so far as I am aware, the other authors cited by Nisbet—never claimed that it did measure the net value of foreign investment. What it does measure, and probably substantially underestimates, is the extent to which U.S. corporations regularly extract from the rest of the world much more than they put into it. This has nothing to do with "the limited context of the U.S. balance of payments." What are involved here are basic data, for the most part reported by the corporations themselves, which, like many other kinds of data, are used in calculating the balance of payments.

> Second, these two *flows* have different time dimensions with outflows relating to the short run and remittances relating to the intermediate or long run. Since profits are a function of total investments in these remittances, flows must be analyzed in relation to the accumulating *stock* of investments. The annual outflows

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represent an addition to the present stock of investments. . . . [I]n a few years a constant outflow of private capital would generate remittances that exceeded the capital export. Thus, we see that direct investments raise both the base from which remittances must be paid and the productive capital from which remittances are generated.

But what does this prove other than that Baran and I were perfectly correct when we stated that foreign investment is a "most efficient device for transferring surplus generated abroad to the investing country"? The fact that it may also (but not necessarily) raise the amount of surplus generated abroad in no way refutes this proposition.

Third, this comparison [between outflows and remittances] ignores the fact that the base for generating direct investment income is not solely capital movements from the U.S. The base can also be financed internally by U.S. firms operating abroad, retained earnings plus depreciation charges, or by U.S. companies borrowing in foreign markets. In fact, capital outlays from the U.S. are the least important, accounting for only about 20 percent while internal finance accounts for about 50 percent and foreign borrowing nearly 30 percent.

Of course the comparison in question "ignores" these further facts. But which way do they cut in the overall argument? Surely the fact that U.S. corporations, while sending abroad $20 as investment, can at the same time expand their foreign assets by $100 and that this $100 rather than the $20 becomes the basis of the next period's remittance, is the clincher for Baran's and my contention that foreign investment is "a most efficient device for transferring surplus generated abroad to the investing country." It seems to me that only a neoclassical economist could fail to see something as obvious as this.

Finally, and central to the question of economic development itself, this approach ignores the fact that direct investment theoretically engages in productive activity which may generate its own capacity to make remittances.

Essentially, this is the same point as Nisbet's second above. It is true that the comparison of outflows and remittances by itself tells us nothing about the build-up of productive capital in the receiving country. But neither does any other theory, as

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Nisbet tacitly admits when he says that direct investment "may" generate its own capacity to make remittances. It may not too. But this is not the point. The question at issue is whether whatever surplus is generated by foreign-owned capital remains in the country or is drained off by the foreign capitalists. And not all the capitalist apologetics in the world can hide the truth that a very large part of it is drained off.

In conclusion, let me add a couple of observations which are outside the purview of neoclassical economics. Much foreign investment, as Baran and I pointed out in *Monopoly Capital,* never involved *any* export of capital from the investing country. We cited the case of the Ford Motor Company of Canada, which was founded by a Canadian who put up the money and handed majority ownership over to the U.S. company in exchange for patent rights. From then on this "investment" grew rapidly and paid handsome dividends to the parent corporation. A systematic study of the history of foreign investments would probably show that cases of this kind are by no means exceptional: there is room here for any number of useful course papers, honors theses, and PhD dissertations.

Finally, if you want to evaluate the role of foreign investment in the Third World, perhaps the most important thing to do is to go to some of the countries where that role has been especially prominent and look for yourself. Go to Mexico, for example, and see the kind of "development" which has taken place there: hopeless poverty and misery for the great majority, disgusting wealth and luxury for a small privileged minority. It may rate well on the GDP scale, and in this case foreign investment has probably contributed importantly to the rapid GDP growth rate of the post-Second World War period. But in human terms it is nothing short of a disaster.

Let me add as a sort of postscript (since it does not relate directly to anything said by Nisbet) that the radical analysis of development and underdevelopment is by no means exclusively concerned with foreign investment and its quantitative effects on the generation and transfer of surplus between the investing and receiving countries. This is only one aspect of a very complex set of relations, and even its role has been subject to wide variations depending on historical time and place. For exam-

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ple, the effect of British investment in the United States during the nineteenth century was very different from that of contemporaneous British investment in Latin America, largely because the United States was a young imperialist country in its own right while the Latin American countries were semi-colonies (or, perhaps more accurately, the world's first neocolonies). Similarly, we cannot equate the investment of present-day giant U.S. corporations in the Third World with those in Western Europe, one very important reason being that giant European corporations also have very large (and growing) investments in the United States. Radical economic theory is not a dry set of formulas valid for all times and all places but rather a guide to the interpretation and understanding of the actual historical processes which have led from the past to the present and are leading from the present to the future.

So far as the underdeveloped countries are concerned, foreign investment with its attendant transfer of surplus to the developed countries, is undoubtedly an important factor, but it is very far from being the only or even the main cause of underdevelopment. More concretely, the expropriation of foreign-owned assets and the retention in the country of whatever surplus they may help to generate, are necessary but by no means sufficient conditions for the launching of a genuine process of development.* If the government in the expropriating country remains in the hands of the same old ruling classes, the consequence will be that these local exploiters will be enriched, not that the impoverished masses will be benefited. Only if it is the result of, or accompanied by, a real social revolution, i.e., the transfer of *political* power from owners to workers, will the expropriation of foreign investment help to lay the ground for development which is worthy of the name.

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* I think I speak for all radical economists when I say that in our minds there is not the slightest doubt about the morality or legality of expropriation without any compensation whatsoever. In nine cases out of ten, the original investment (if any) has been repaid many times over. For a vivid illustration of this process, see the case of Cyprus and the U.S.-owned Cyprus Mines Corporation, described in Paul M. Sweezy and Harry Magdoff, *The Dynamics of U.S. Capitalism: Corporate Structure, Inflation, Credit, Gold, and the Dollar* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), "Foreign Investment," pp. 31-42.

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THE MOROCCAN CRISIS: NATIONALISM AND IMPERIALISM ON EUROPE'S PERIPHERY

BY JAMES A. PAUL

The nearly successful army coup on July 10, 1971 drew attention to the deep crisis which exists in Morocco but until then was virtually ignored by the world press. More recently this crisis has been underscored by the dramatic assassination attempt on the life of King Hassan II by elements of the air force on August 16, 1972.

For years Morocco was extolled by the bourgeois press for its "stable, thousand-year-old monarchy" and its exotic tourist attractions, and passed over in silence by socialist writers since the decline of its powerful labor movement and the death of its colorful left leader Mehdi Ben Barka. Meanwhile, Morocco has been undergoing a profound process of underdevelopment from which revolutionary forces are beginning to emerge, including some armed resistance in the countryside, massive student strikes in the schools and universities, and a resurgence of rank-and-file militance among miners and urban workers.

This article examines the historical development of Morocco's dependent political economy in an effort to draw the major outlines of the unfolding crisis. What emerges is a classic case of what might be called the "maintenance system" of neo-colonialism. Aimed at neither a zone of new investments nor an outlet for expanding trade, imperial policy here has been dominated by an effort to maintain huge colonial investments and to assure continued trade relations in the orbit of metropolitan France. In addition, France and the United States have been

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interested in maintaining Morocco as a strategic area—at once Arab and African, Atlantic and Mediterranean—safely in their diplomatic and military sphere. But the "development strategy" for Morocco, based on high levels of foreign aid,* on agricultural "modernization," and on various internal consolidations geared to Morocco's eventual incorporation into the Common Market, is weakened by the instability of the political regime: a corrupt monarchy, wielding an unreliable army and a venal, inefficient bureaucracy, all tottering on the narrow social base of a comprador and bureaucratic bourgeoisie.

Before focusing our attention on the independence period, we will briefly survey Morocco's historical relation to European imperialism. Due to its proximity to Europe, its extensive coastline, its trade routes to the south, and its rich agricultural regions, Morocco has been the object of European colonialism beginning with the Romans. In the modern period, the Portuguese established seacoast fortress towns during their major era of seaborne expansion (ca. 1500), although they were later expelled by the Moroccans as their power waned. Other powers, notably the British and the Spanish, established coastal enclaves later on, particularly in the city of Tangiers with its large bay and strategic location on the African side of the Straits of Gibraltar. But the major pressure of European colonialism on Morocco and the development of imperial aspirations with regard to the whole territory and not just the enclaves did not begin until after the onset of the industrial revolution. During the course of the nineteenth century, Morocco was steadily opened up to the European trade, her armies twice defeated by the Europeans (by the French, in the east in 1844, and by the Spanish in the north in 1860), and her finances fell increasingly under the control of European bankers. After 1860, her customs control and duties passed into European hands, while European missionaries began to penetrate the interior.

After a period of maneuvering by the various "interested" powers (Britain, France, Germany), the French successfully

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* Among the top aid recipients from both France and the United States, Morocco is one of the most heavily "aided" countries in the world per capita, outside of immediate war zones.

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established their hegemony, beginning with military operations from the west (Casablanca) and the east (Algeria) in 1907, and concluding with the signing of a treaty of "protection" in 1912. A section of the north was reserved for Spanish colonial administration, while the city of Tangiers was given international status to placate British and Spanish interests ensconced there. The Moroccan Sultan was maintained as a purely symbolic ruler, in effect totally subordinate to the French Resident General and his superiors in Paris. But in spite of the capitulation of the Sultan before French power, all of Moroccan territory was not subjugated by the French without a long and bitter struggle. French military might was valiantly resisted by the Moroccan people during the course of a "pacification program" lasting 28 years; resistance was not finally crushed until 1934, after the death of at least 100,000 Moroccans, as well as some 30,000 French soldiers. Right up to the time of independence, the French had to govern a substantial proportion of the country through direct military administration.

During the period of the French Protectorate, a European colonial population of nearly 400,000 was installed on Moroccan territory; some million hectares of the best land was seized for colonial export farming; mining was developed (phosphates, lead, iron, cobalt, etc.); a generally "modern" colonial economy was set up with railroads, ports, new cities, banks, minor local industries, and a large service sector; while the Moroccans were pushed to the super-exploited economic peripheries. In all, about $3 billion worth of private investments were made in the country during this time, mostly in the French zone by French capital, and distributed as follows:

PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN FRENCH MOROCCO, 1954

	Millions of Dollars	*Percent*
Commerce, Mines, Industry	1,620	60
Urban Real Estate	600	23
Agriculture	450	17
Total	2,670	100

These colonial investments were dominated by several large

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French banks, most notably the Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas (at the center of whose empire was the colonial State Bank) and the Banque de l'Union Parisienne.

The movement for Moroccan independence began to surface in urban intellectual circles even before the end of the pacification era. Kept in check by the French by the use of prison, exile, press censorship, and other forms of control until about 1950, the movement began to burgeon thereafter. The French deposition of the Sultan in 1953 for his cautious support of the nationalists shattered the slim remnants of French authority and gave rise to a period of mass action, including networks of urban and rural terrorism, and two small clandestine armies of liberation. Attempting to lead, to control, and to moderate this movement was the bourgeois-dominated Independence Party (Istiqal), which called for independence "with continued close relations with the metropole," the restoration of the deposed monarch, and the institution of liberal democracy which the party expected to dominate. After about two years of increasingly intense struggle, with the masses becoming ever more involved, the French capitulated and hastily accorded Moroccan independence under royal government, over the objections of the colonial farmers, the urban colonial workers, and the petty bourgeoisie. The government in Paris was anxious to protect the huge investments of metropolitan big capital in Morocco and concerned with devoting full attention to the rising nationalist struggle in Algeria.* This French strategy, while ultimately failing to contain the Algerian revolution, proved to be brilliantly successful in Morocco in paving the way for the desired "smooth transition" to independence—in effect maintaining Morocco firmly in the French neocolonial orbit.

* The French were faced with a number of movements of national liberation throughout their crumbling colonial empire. The conflict in Indochina had demoralized the French army; the fall of Dienbienphu in 1954 coincided with the crescendo of the movements in both Morocco and Tunisia and the opening phase in Algeria. A fight on all these fronts would not have been possible. The French concession of independence for Morocco in 1955 thus directly followed two other cases of consolidated colonial retreat: independence for Tunisia and the Geneva "settlement" of the Indochina war.

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King Mohammed V* insisted on reserving for himself broad powers and kept the politicians at bay by appointing many of them as individuals to his cabinets and promising elections "when the country was ready." Colonial political administration was thus, in effect, continued with a national façade. By 1958, three years after independence, French judges still presided over the courts, French officers held many of the top army commands, French colonial farms remained securely in place, and French interests owned nearly all of the modern economy: utilities, transport, newspapers, mines, manufacturing, urban real estate, banks, big commercial establishments, and so on. Trade remained firmly tied to the metropole, with Moroccan exports continuing to be limited by the colonial economic structure to minerals (principally phosphates) and agricultural produce (principally oranges). Precious foreign exchange, indispensable for acquiring an industrial base, was squandered on imports which included agricultural commodities (wheat, sugar) which could easily have been home-grown if agriculture had not been geared to producing specialized export crops. Foreign exchange was also wasted in financing the luxury purchases of the urban upper and middle classes, including the large foreign colony.

The Independence Party leaders had effectively collaborated with the Palace and foreign capitalist interests in restoring order and establishing state control over the many autonomous groupings that had sprung up during the independence struggle. They were thus unable to wrest either control of the state or even bourgeois democratic forms from the king. The party's aspirations were checkmated by royal legitimacy as symbol of the nationalist struggle, by Palace manipulations of rural unrest based on hostility to the urban bourgeois character of the nationalist leadership,** and by solid imperialist support of the throne. While the party leaders vacillated, uncertain as to how to back up their claims to govern, the Palace grip on the new nation was constantly being consolidated.

* The title of *sultan* was changed to *king* shortly after independence.

** French army officers supplied weapons and generally fostered these early movements of rural unrest which undercut the Independence Party and helped consolidate Palace authority.

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As economic conditions in the urban economy deteriorated under the impact of post-independence capital flight, strikes were frequent and often very militant. The urban workers, who had been the backbone of the movement for independence, were ready to fight for more than simply the formalities of decolonization. But the response of the old nationalist leaders was to fulminate against "sterile agitation" and to use police strike-breakers ever more openly. Under pressure from the rank-and-file, the trade union leadership increasingly detached itself from the Independence Party. Finally the party split, its left wing forming the new National Union of Popular Forces.* This was the party of Ben Barka—social democratic in its program and flavored with republicanism, but refusing to make a clean break with its nationalist origins, as its title suggests. In its charter, the party's founders claimed to be "abandoning all partisan sectarianism" and asserted that "there is absolutely no contradiction between the interests of different social strata of the Moroccan people and that only their union can thwart imperialist aims and assure the realization of national objectives." Though the party was born of worker militancy, the leaders from the outset aspired to establish not a workers' party but rather a neo-nationalist popular front. Such a strategy is not entirely surprising, for this was the era when the European social democratic parties were disavowing their working-class character; furthermore, Morocco's "feudal" social structure seemed to offer little ground for the development of uncompromisingly socialist politics to leaders inspired by "classic" European socialism (See table, page 21).

In practice, the new party's major bases of support were the urban workers, peasants and agricultural workers in two major agricultural areas (Souss and Gharb), the majority of the nationalist intellectuals, and elements of the small national wing of the Moroccan bourgeoisie. In spite of the weaknesses inherent in its strategic outlook, the party's dynamic leadership and militant worker base made it an obvious threat to the Palace. The king, however, was able to coopt the party, whose

* Often referred to as the UNFP (Union Nationale des Forces Populaires). Its Arab title is al-Itihad al-Watani lil-Quwat al-Sh'abiya.

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MOROCCAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE: 1960
(rough estimates based on 1960 census)

Occupation	*Households*	*Percentage*
Agricultural workers	120,000	5
Small peasants (incl. communal) and nomads	1,100,000	46
Middle and big peasants	100,000	4
Traditional landlords	10,000	
Modern farmers	10,000	
Shopkeepers and artisans	180,000	8
Workers in traditional manufacturing and services + servants	220,000	9
Workers in modern industry, mines, and services	250,000	10
Administration, army and police	100,000	4
Professionals, managers and top administration	25,000	1
Lumpenproletariat	200,000	8
Emigré workers	60,000	3
Total	2,375,000	98

leaders accepted collaboration with the Palace by taking many major posts in a new royal cabinet formed in December 1958. But key ministries of Interior (police) and Defense remained under royal control. Nevertheless, the Unionist leadership vainly hoped to put through a progressive new program and simultaneously to achieve control of the total governmental apparatus and reduce royal authority.

To build its popular support, education and social welfare programs were expanded and an ambitious five-year development plan was prepared with the aid of progressive French economists. The Plan was based on the idea of a mixed economy with state-sponsored heavy industry forming new economic "poles of attraction" to which foreign as well as domestic investments would be drawn. Concurrently a major land reform was planned to win the support of the peasantry and to provide the increased internal market necessary to sustain domestic industrial growth. These plans were, of course, implacably opposed by the French imperialists, by the Palace, and by the comprador bourgeoisie. The Unionists, hedged in by their government positions, blocked by royal vetoes, and with their or-

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ganization under pressure from the police, failed either to govern, to consolidate their forces, or to bid directly for state power in the streets. In February 1960, while they continued in office, the party's press was closed, numerous cadres were arrested, and Ben Barka forced to remain abroad in exile in connection with an alleged plot against the life of Crown Prince Hassan. The following month, a rival trade union was set up under Palace auspices to undercut the Unionist base among the workers.* Finally, in May 1960, the Union government was dismissed and the king himself took over as prime minister.

The masses, confused and demoralized by Unionist containment (including no-strike orders and urging of "sacrifices" on the workers) and still loyal to the king as "martyr" of the independence movement, were incapable of intervening independently in the struggle and were stripped of their most powerful leader with the exile of Ben Barka. The only other source of potential mass leadership, the Communist Party, was compromised by Palace ties and popular-front politics of its own.** A hostility between the Unionists and the Communists rendered united action impossible. Consequently, the Unionist government folded without a major confrontation of forces. And while Ben Barka and others liked to refer to this event as a "royal coup d'état," such a description is quite misleading, since the monarchy and its imperialist allies had never lost control of state power in the first place.

Palace plans for the country fitted nicely into current

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* This new union, tied to the reconstituted Independence Party, was not particularly successful in stealing a clientele for itself. It got about 10 percent of the workers.

** In fact, the CP had little mass following, although it had influence among the intellectuals. Even more thoroughly committed than the Unionists to forming an alliance with the bourgeoisie, its theorists even managed to see the monarchy as a bourgeois force: "In order to win the national revolution, the main thrust must be directed against imperialism and the class which has tied its destiny to that of imperialism: the feudalists. The Moroccan proletariat, allied with the small peasantry, must constitute the determining force of a broad popular grouping, which brings together all layers of the petty bourgeoisie as well as certain elements of the national bourgeoisie . . . including the monarchical bourgeoisie in power."

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strategies of European monopoly capital for its peripheral zones. The Palace was opposed to the development of industry and the growth of the cities, which would strengthen the social basis for socialist and republican political forces. Such development would also strengthen the national wing of the Moroccan bourgeosie, thus leading at best to parliamentarianism and a reduction of royal powers. The Palace option was therefore for a "development" based on the countryside, which would attempt to contain social change as much as possible while promoting conservative tendencies, such as the expansion of the rural middle peasantry. Vast new dams and irrigation projects would absorb rural labor in construction, improve export crop yields, and create newly fertile lands which could be distributed to develop the middle peasantry without disturbing existing large landholdings.

European capital was fully satisfied with this program. No longer drawn into labor-intensive types of investments* and reaping high profits from the soaring European industrialization under the Common Market, it had three principal interests in the Moroccan situation: a continued supply of cheap labor for the nothern European factories, a nearby market for industrial goods, and the protection of the existing investments. There was little prospect for additional mining investment, and the development of import-substitution industries would tend to close off the markets for newly installed productive capacity in Europe. State-sponsored irrigation, on the other hand, would generate business for European builders, steelmakers, and heavy-equipment manufacturers (not to mention local European-owned cement factories), and would encourage specialized agricultural production (in citrus fruits) that in turn would create a permanent need for European wheat. Tourism, a second "priority" area, would stimulate building and purchases of such industrial goods as air conditioners, aircraft, passenger railroad

* For a discussion of the contemporary tendency of monopoly capital to invest in production with a high organic composition of capital, cf. Ernesto Laclau: "Argentina—Imperialist Strategy and the May Crisis," *New Left Review* (July-August 1970), pp. 3-21, and Aníbal Quijano: "Nationalism and Capitalism in Peru," MONTHLY REVIEW (July-August, 1971), *passim*.

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equipment, buses, and so on. Such an economy would fit nicely into the economic periphery of the expanding Common Market.

The Palace program had powerful backing. From abroad it had the full support of the French and American governments, French big capital interests, and the international financial agencies (IMF, World Bank), thus assuring generous economic and military aid to help pay for the new investments, to keep government operations solvent, and to re-enforce the apparatus of control against any challenges from the masses. In Morocco it was fully supported by the majority of the French community, by the major wing of the Moroccan bourgeoisie engaged in comprador activities (whose lucrative trading and commercial businesses would continue to prosper), and by the large Moroccan landholders (whose holdings would not be threatened by land reform and who would profit from increases in land value and yields due to irrigation), as well as by profiteer elements within the bureaucracy. In addition, it had the support (or at least the acquiescence) of many artisans, small shopkeepers, and local petty capital interests, for whom the Unionist industrialization program represented a threat (the reconstituted Independence Party, collaborating for a brief time in the royal government after 1960, tended to represent these interests). Acquiescent support was also won from elements of the peasantry opposed to the Union Party emphasis on the cities and collectivization of the land, for whom an agricultural development priority seemed to offer great hope.

Following their departure from the government, the Unionist forces fell into increasing disarray. One element of the leadership attempted to employ the trade unions as a political force to bring about a Palace capitulation. A general strike was discussed for mid-1961 and had substantial support from the rank and file of many of the unions, especially the civil service unions whose wages had been frozen since independence. But the top trade union leadership (several of whom sat on the Unionist Central Committee) blocked these plans through various maneuvers with the Palace which resulted in token concessions of a purely economic kind. Finally, in December 1961, the telephone workers struck independently, followed by work-

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ers in the radio station and some high foreign-service employees, while the other civil-service unions were held back by their leaders, who were unwilling to risk a direct confrontation with the state. With this lack of solidarity, the strike was quickly broken by the regime and severe sanctions employed. From then on a more or less open break between the trade union leadership and the other leaders of the Union Party developed, with Palace blessings.

In spite of the continuing split among Unionist forces and the lack of alternative leadership, opportunities for the Left revived in 1962. The regime was weakened by the death of King Mohammed V and the succession of his son Hassan II in February 1961, the son not sharing the legitimacy of his father in the eyes of the people. During the early part of 1962 the revolution in Algeria was drawing to a triumphant close and mass enthusiasm for the cause of a free and united Maghreb was at a high pitch in Morocco, both in the cities and in the countryside. In May, Ben Barka returned to attend the second congress of the Union Party and personally began to set up an intensive campaign of organizing for the party, particularly in the rural areas. This organizing process, however, was soon channeled by the Palace into the game of electoral politics. A constitution was announced (November 1962) followed by a referendum (December) and legislative elections (May 1963).

The Unionists attempted to persuade the people to boycott the referendum, opposing both the extensive royal prerogatives in the new constitution and the fact that it was elaborated in secret (by French advisors!) without a constitutional convention. Such legalisms found little response from a people in desperate poverty and with no familiarity with electoral politics; the constitution was ratified overwhelmingly with only few abstentions. For the legislative elections, the Palace set up an electoral Front, placing ministers in key contested districts in the cities and large towns. The election was probably more or less honest (say, within 20 percent) and most of the royal ministers were defeated, but the Front came out ahead with 34 percent of the vote, compared to 30 percent for the Independence Party and 23 percent for the Unionists. In electoral

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arithmetic, this gave the Front 48 percent of the parliamentary seats—with a few independents, a bare majority.*

But there was more to politics in this period than simply elections. During the summer of 1962, the state of mass political engagement was at its highest level since independence. Political campaigning and organizing were widespread, socialist measures in Algeria had just been instituted, and rumors circulated of an Algerian-based liberation of Morocco. Some peasant land seizures suggested the militance of many of the rural masses. The Palace response to this situation was one of direct repression. In June and July, many hundreds of the Unionist cadres were rounded up on yet another "plot" charge, stripping away the most militant leadership at the base level. This process culminated in a raid on July 16th on the session of the National Council of the Party at its headquarters in Casablanca. Over a hundred top leaders were arrested, many to be subject to long imprisonment and torture before trial. Ben Barka, out of the country on one of his many international missions, began his second and final exile.

The weakness of the organized Left was now thoroughly manifest. Only the students, organized solidly into a national student union, rallied again and again against the regime in strikes and protests.** The Left's weakness was underlined in the events of March 1965, when riots shook most of the major cities of the country and especially Casablanca. They revealed the depth of the opposition to the regime that had been building up in the cities and the weakness of the left organizations which were completely unable to lead or to intervene decisively at this crucial juncture. Special security forces directed by the ruthless Interior Minister General Mohammed Oufkir brutally suppressed the mass uprisings. The regime then made gestures at coopting the opposition parties into a "unity" government and then moved into a state of emergency which silenced fur-

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* Later, when the Parliament came into session, the royalist Front fell apart. The regime, unable to command a majority, ignored the impotent new body.

** Somewhat divided between a majority with ties to the Unionists and a minority with ties to the Communists, the students tended to take an independent line to the left of the two parties on most questions.

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ther political activity, including a virtual ban on political organizing. Ben Barka's murder (generally believed to have been ordered by the Palace and personally carried out by Oufkir with the aid of the French political police) followed a few months later in France. A long political winter began in Morocco, warmed only by the annual round of student strikes and government counter-blows; it did not really begin to thaw until 1970.

Economy, 1960-1970

Following the dismissal of the Union-dominated government in 1960, the new liberal economic strategy quickly emerged. Land reform programs were scrapped and the industrial programs faded into the background as plans like the projected steel mill were set aside as "uneconomic." Significantly, in 1962, shares in the key National Economic Development Bank were sold to the World Bank, bringing foreign ownership in this state-sponsored institution up to a majority. The next year, World Bank economists were invited to Morocco to make recommendations for a new development plan. Following their advice and that of French liberal economists and planners, the regime embarked on its new investment priorities, pouring resources into dam building and other "infrastructure" for agriculture, and elevating tourism to a high place as the second-ranking motor force in the new economy.

The state role in the economy did not diminish, however, with the shift from social democracy to liberalism, but rather increased. The conditions leading to this were already evident before and during the Unionist government: new foreign capital was not entering the country, and the Moroccan bourgeoisie was (apart from exporting its capital) interested only in low-risk and quick-profit activities such as land speculation and commerce. The Five Year Plan had projected the state's share of gross investment to be only 20 percent in 1961, but in fact it was 50 percent and on the increase. This new role of the state had two principal characteristics: it was essentially capitalist in character (not changing but re-enforcing existing economic structures and ceding always the most profitable ventures to private capital), and it was dependent on foreign public support (since a sufficient internal surplus could not be gen-

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erated with the existing structures). The overwhelmingly public nature of new foreign capital is suggested by the fact that while new private investments from abroad totalled only $60 million during the first ten years of independence, foreign public loans (principally from France, the United States, and the World Bank) were running at between $80 and $120 million *per year.*

The leading role of the alliance of the Moroccan state and foreign public capital reflects the particular circumstances of the Moroccan situation. Foreign private investment was already at a very high level and needed to be preserved and redeployed, while new private capital was in heavy demand in Europe. The agricultural sector required enormous investments to meet the political and economic role assigned to it—investments in dams and irrigation systems which could only be undertaken by the state. Thus this public character of the investment process must be seen as a transitional phase from the colonial economic structures to those of the fully articulated neocolony, integrated into the new structures of the Common Market.

The state economic role grew also as a result of several nationalizations which had long been called for by the Left: some French farmland, railroads, electricity, and water distribution. While the regime undoubtedly benefited politically from this, the principal factor must be recognized as being the need for capital redeployment. The Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas and the other principal owners of the nationalized properties were bailed out of worn-out and unprofitable public-service investments with extremely generous compensation awards.* They were thus permitted to repatriate about half their capital to France and to shift the remainder into high-profit growth sectors such as tourism. The badly needed modernization of the older investments could then be undertaken by the state and the enterprises run at a loss, as a further form of subsidy to private investment.

* The high level of these compensations is indicated by the sharp upward movement of the stock prices of the nationalized companies on the Paris Bourse during the course of negotiations. The electricity company stock rose over 50 percent from its pre-nationalization level, while the stock of the railroad company rose over 150 percent!

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Other sorts of redeployment in the economy included the progressive liquidation of the holdings of French small capital with the migration back to France of much of the colonial population (farms, restaurants, bars, small hotels, and shops of all kinds were sold to Moroccan nationals). The virtual French monopoly ended with the penetration of the Belgians, the Germans, and such American interests as the First National City Bank, the Bank of America, the Continental Illinois National Bank, and Aerojet General.* Some small Moroccan interests emerged in banking and insurance, and—unique case of significant productive investment by the national bourgeoisie—in textile manufacturing. But foreign interests continued to dominate the heights of the economy with a controlling interest in about 80 percent of private industry and banking.

So impotent was the national bourgeoisie in the face of this enormous neocolonial presence that it was unable even to secure positions as front-men for the foreign capital. A sample survey of directors of 160 private industrial enterprises carried out by the Planning Service in 1970 discovered that only 13 percent of them were Moroccans! This continuation of foreign nationals in the command posts of the society is not limited only to the domain of private enterprise, though it is particularly pronounced there. Using data from 1968, we find that of the 30,000 top management and professional posts throughout the society, more than half are foreign (mostly French). (See table, page 30)

Foreign military presence reflected yet another dimension of the collaboration of the Moroccan state with imperialism. Despite the fact that the French had been forced to give up their many colonial bases and the Americans their four Strategic Air Command bomber bases in the early years after indepen-

* The most powerful American interests in international finance were actually not in competition with the French in Morocco at all but operating in partnership with them. Both Rockefeller and Morgan interests have had a big stake in the dominant Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas. Rockefeller participation runs through their allied investment banking house of Lazard Frères whose leading partners, André Meyer (New York) and Pierre David-Weill (Paris), own a major if not controlling interest in the French bank. The Morgan Group has a smaller share via the Insurance Company of North America, which also owns a substantial bloc of BPPB shares.

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TOP MANAGEMENT AND PROFESSIONALS IN MOROCCO, 1968

Sector	*Total*	*Foreign*	*Percent Foreign*
Public Administration	6,000	1,500	25
Banks, Insurance	1,000	500	50
Industry, Transportation, Commerce, Communications	8,000	5,500	69
Professionals (Doctors, Lawyers, Professors, Secondary School Teachers)	15,000	8,500	56
Total	30,000	16,000	53

dence (they were evacuated by 1963), the "presence" continued to be formidable. The United States maintained a naval air station, two naval communications centers, and a National Security Agency electronic surveillance center, as well as various strategic radar facilities, while supplying $100 million in assistance and arms, the second largest military program in Africa (after Emperor Haile Selassie's Ethiopia). The French kept a large "training" mission in Morocco, numbering some 500. This mission permeated the Moroccan army, occupying, in effect, parallel commands and numbering nearly as many as the 629 senior Moroccan officers.* French advisors were also to be found in the police apparatus; both France and the United States engaged in police training programs, including 20 Moroccans trained at the International Police Academy in Washington and several times that number at its Paris equivalent.

Sources of the Growing Crisis, I: Austerity

If the implications of the new liberalism became quickly evident to left ideologues and economists after 1960, the effects were not immediately translated into decisive material changes for the masses. Mass welfare began to be dramatically altered for the worse, and mass consciousness of this process began to develop around 1964. Expansionist government budgets generated inflation and a serious foreign exchange

* The United States also engaged in training military personnel at its Moroccan bases and abroad. The number trained from 1950 to 1970 totaled 1,700.

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deficit. The International Monetary Fund, along with the World Bank and the aiding governments, moved in to insist on financial orthodoxy and austerity as a precondition for continued support. As a consequence, social service programs were curtailed and restructured so as to give maximum "return," and new regressive taxes were imposed. Among the former, most notable was the shift in education policy away from the emphasis on mass education and literacy to an emphasis on elite manpower training ("investment" in the literacy of an unemployed peasant is a waste in the liberal schema). Outstanding among the new taxes was a heavy new tax on sugar, the major food item purchased in the money economy by the rural masses. Nearly doubling the price of sugar, this tax had the effect of dramatically reducing sugar consumption and increasing still further the already serious malnutrition.

INDEX OF SUGAR CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA (1963 = 100)

1960	*1961*	*1962*	*1963*	*1964*	*1965*	*1966*	*1967*	*1968*
103	n.a.	101	100	92	86	85	82	82

The riots in March 1965 were a response to this situation, and the state of emergency which followed demonstrated the need to impose the new economic policies by force.

Imperial Consolidation and Stagnation of the Late 1960s

Under the cover of the state of emergency, the remainder of the consolidation and rationalization of the Moroccan economy went forward in the late sixties. In 1966 Morocco applied for association with the Common Market. Many of the smaller banks and insurance companies closed or merged, as did some of the smaller industrial firms. By 1968 the number of banks had decreased to one half the number at the time of independence. Meanwhile the various aiding countries and agencies strengthened their coordination. In April 1967 the World Bank called together a conference on aid to Morocco in Washington, assembling the twelve aiding countries as well as the IMF and the UN Special Fund. In a press conference at the termination of this conference, Moroccan Finance Minister Mamoun Tahiri announced confidently: "Morocco has chosen the path

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of liberalism. We will serve as an example in this regard to all of Africa." And shortly afterwards the U.S. Ambassador in Rabat, Henry Tasca, spoke of Morocco as a future "showpiece of free enterprise development." In spite of this optimism and the extremely high level of foreign aid (some 40 percent of the national budget), the Moroccan economy stagnated in the face of a growing population, lifted out of outright regression only by the occasional years of exceptional harvest:

INDEX OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT PER CAPITA

'51	*'52*	*'53*	*'54*	*'55*	*'56*	*'57*	*'58*	*'59*	*'60*	*'61*
101	104	108	108	104	100	91	104	95	96	90

'62	*'63*	*'64*	*'65*	*'66*	*'67*	*'68*	*'69*
99	101	100	99	94	98	106	103

The foreign aid, in fact, even with its special terms and low interest rates, began to pile up a heavy international debt whose charges were weighing ever more onerously on the country's national income and balance of payments. With nearly three quarters of new investment going into construction or (unfruitful) petroleum exploration, and with terms of trade in steady decline, the Moroccan economy seemed to be moving into an ever more complete role of dependency on imperial state finance. In the new Five Year Plan, published in 1968, the planners looked with some unease on this process, projecting the future debt position as follows:

PROJECTIONS OF GOVERNMENT PLANNING OFFICE CONCERNING FOREIGN DEBT

		(*million $*)		
	1970	*1975*	*1980*	*1985*
Annual Loan	120	120	120	120
Amortization and Interest Charges	66	104	138	158
Balance	+54	+16	—18	—38

In spite of the concern of the planners, no modification was made in the basic program. In 1969 Morocco became an "associate" in the Common Market, thus assured of equal status

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with the other associated peripheral states, while dropping tariff protections for some of its industries. The final phase of integration with the new European monopoly system seemed to be at hand.

Sources of Crisis, II: Agriculture

Nearly three quarters of Morocco's fifteen million people live on the land. While colonial ideology depicts a docile, "traditional," rural population with blind loyalty to the monarchy and its local emissaries, the history of the actions of the rural masses—in the long resistance to the French conquerors, in the independence movement, and in various manifestations of rural unrest in the independence period—makes clear the tension inherent in any agricultural policy designed to fit the needs of European monopoly capital and its local allies. The major strategy, as we have seen, was to expand the "modern" (capitalist) sector, to create a middle peasantry, and generally to hold the people on the land and out of the cities. Yet almost any concrete approach to this was so fraught with political difficulties for the regime that programs were postponed again and again, and only the relatively uncontroversial dam-building went forward. The rural crisis was thus slower in developing than that in the cities.

The agricultural issue was not fully joined by the regime until about 1969 with the publication of a new Code of Agricultural Investments and the announcement that an enormous new irrigation and agricultural development project in the country's major farm region was to be funded by the World Bank. This project, known as Project Sebou and focusing on the 300,000 hectares of the rich Gharb Valley in the Moroccan northwest, epitomizes the unfolding Moroccan agricultural crisis.

The Gharb Valley had been heavily developed by French colonial farmers and agribusiness interests who had managed to take about 100,000 hectares of the best land. The remainder was farmed in a traditional manner, about half communally and about half by middle and rich peasants. The plan for the transformation of this area into modern irrigated farming was under study by a special team of international experts brought together under the auspices of the Food and Agriculture Or-

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ganization of the UN and funded, in part, out of the UN Special Fund. FAO administrators announced at the outset that, in light of its size and the full UN participation, the Gharb development would be a "pilot" project and the "laboratory" for planning in the whole Mediterranean basin.

The possibilities of land reform began to disappear even while the UN study was in progress, as a partial nationalization of French land in the valley in 1963 set off sales of the remaining French lands to big Moroccan farmers and land speculators, in spite of laws prohibiting such transactions. Among the land speculators were many high-ranking bureaucrats and military officers as well as members of the comprador bourgeoisie; the complicity of the bureaucrats was a *sine qua non* for obtaining the necessary "special permission" for the land transfers. In the late sixties this process accelerated, and land in the traditional sector began to be purchased as well, as a result of rising land values and a severe flood which wiped out many small proprietors. Land speculation was fed by the World Bank project financing, by a government agricultural credit program which loaned most of its funds to the big agribusiness operators, by the discovery of a major gas deposit in the region (by the Belgian firm Petrofina), and by the announced interest of several foreign firms (including Del Monte and Libby) in setting up local canneries. Between 1965 and 1970 big Moroccan proprietors grabbed 45,000 hectares of land; at the same time the middle peasantry declined by about 10 percent and the landless peasants increased dramatically by 12,000 households, or 150 percent.

Peasant land seizures were a growing response to this situation, culminating in a widely publicized seizure at Ouled Khalifa in November 1970. Several middle peasants had bought the land of a departing French farmer, with state permission. Shortly afterwards, however, their money was returned and the land was sold to two rich landowners. When this new sale became known to the peasants, as the new owners began to work the land, the peasants angrily took over. The state security forces were called and at least seven peasants were killed and many others wounded and arrested in the ensuing battle. Similar events have happened elsewhere. Spontaneous attacks on the

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railroad system in many parts of the country have been another response of displaced peasants. In September 1972, no less than nine incidents of this kind were reported, including the burning of railway cars in a depot and several stone-throwing assaults on passing trains.

Once a dam is built, the number of landless peasants rises still higher. In the irrigated lands below the American-sponsored dam on the Lower Moulouya in the northeast, the landless peasants number over 50 percent. The Lower Moulouya demonstrates other political dilemmas of the dam-building policy. With land title disputes raging between the big landowners and the small communal peasantry, nearly half of the newly irrigated lands lie unplanted. Meanwhile, the dam's catch-basin fills up with silt from heavy erosion in the upstream drainage area because of the heavy grazing of nomad herders. To check this process and to clear the way for forestation, the local governor has forbidden the herders access to the area, a move stripping them of their livelihood and leading to several clashes with the security forces.

Some dry-land agricultural projects have equally provoked political opposition in the countryside. The recently inaugurated King Ranch operation in the Adaroush Valley near Azrou is an example. Sponsored by a $1.5 million local currency loan from USAID, King Ranch is importing Santa Gertrudis cattle and setting up a modern beef operation to service the growing needs of the tourist industry and the privileged urban strata; the Moroccan government, cooperating in this venture, agreed to provide 10,000 hectares of land. The land is being taken from communal grazing land of nomadic herdsmen. Government attempts at "resettling" these tribesmen have led to some of the fiercest clashes since the days of the French "pacification" programs. While the King Ranch frets that the land is not coming fast enough, the regime is (in the words of a King Ranch official) "waging slow but steady war against the nomads."

Throughout Morocco, then, modern large-scale capitalist agriculture is being extended at a rapid rate, and the plans to create a middle peasantry and to keep the people on the land and out of the cities are everywhere in disarray. In the face of

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such trends, various special programs such as the U.S.-sponsored National Promotion scheme are incapable of absorbing the rural unemployment and stemming the urban migration.

Ironically, despite all the rationalization of the export-oriented agriculture, its economic fate has proved to be hardly more positive than its political fate. Moroccan fruits, faced with severe competition from the other Mediterranean states in the Common Market, experienced a sales decline of some 7 percent in the first year of association and are now likely to fall still further, following a Common Market agreement allowing the import of American citrus. The option of the royal regime and its international tutors for an agricultural path to "development" had led to a clear impasse.

The Developing Opposition: The Popular Front and the Coup

The conjuncture of forces which made possible the royalist politics of the early and middle 1960s was substantially transformed by 1970. Foreign capital was alienated by the stupendous level of corruption which had made serious dents in profits. The middle class, thirsty for jobs, became increasingly disenchanted. The workers, contained by wage freezes and threatened by the sagging industrial economy, came ever more firmly into an opposition stance in spite of cautious leadership. Shopkeepers and artisans found their livelihood declining (cloth weavers, for example, were put out of business by new textile plants). And the peasants were thrown into a desperate situation in the midst of the process of renewed land speculation and concentration such as had not occurred since the 1930s under French bayonets. With the chaotic and reactionary nature of educational policy, militancy among the university and high school students attained a new level.* Even in the relatively privileged strata of the state apparatus, such as the army officer corps and the upper bureaucracy, a deep technocratic discontent was beginning to surface. And among the foreign teachers and advisors, heretofore reliable, dissent surfaced as well,

* In 1969-1970 university and high school strikes lasted over a month; the following year they lasted even longer. In 1971-1972, these schools were shut down by strikes for nearly six months—about two thirds of the academic year.

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symbolized by a report, issued by a group of French teachers, which charged that the program of "cultural assistance" was training a privileged national elite which would be the "fifth column of imperialism." In view of these developments, Palace strategists decided that the state of emergency could no longer be maintained and that a renewed effort at parliamentary politics and cooptation would have to be undertaken.

This process climaxed in the summer of 1970 with a Palace proclamation of a new constitution and the opposition's formation of a popular front, known as the National Bloc,* joining together the Unionists, the Independence Party, and the trade unions in opposition to the Palace efforts at erecting a new, controlled parliament.** Led by the familiar old leadership, trapped in a nationalist rhetoric and subjected to heavy repression, the new formation failed to pose a revolutionary alternative to the monarchical system. Only spontaneous or disconnected outbursts occurred. Land seizures, student strikes, riots in the poorest quarters of the cities were not tied together into a nationwide movement of resistance and revolutionary action. On the right wing of the Bloc, the Independence Party maintained its many informal ties with the regime; on the left, Unionist cadres were secretly arrested by the police and tortured in a roundup similar to that of 1963.*** The party and trade union newspapers, briefly freed from control during the elections, were once again closed down or placed under heavy censorship. The Bloc was thus limited to occasional meetings and public statements calling for the withdrawal of American bases, the distribution of land to the peasants, and an end to the domination of the economy by foreign capital. Under the circumstances of the deepening national crisis, with the Bloc

* Arabic: al-Kutla al-Wataniya.

** The Communist pary, officially banned, gave its blessing to the new front as well, without actually joining it. For a more detailed discussion of this electoral phase, with a more optimistic view of the potential of the National Bloc, see the author's "Changing Basis of Moroccan Politics," *New Politics* (Fall 1971) pp. 11-26.

*** After several months during which those arrested were completely incommunicado and the regime denied knowing of their whereabouts, lawyers were informed they were in jail. Brutal tortures had gone on in this period. In early 1971, a trial of 193, mostly Unionist cadre, began in Marrakesh.

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leadership unable or unwilling to risk a direct confrontation with the regime, the situation was ripe for intervention from an increasingly disenchanted army.

The coup attempt of July 10, 1971, was not the first time elements of the army had thoughts of seizing power. Two years previously a plot was discovered in the Marrakesh region and a number of officers were executed; in November 1969 there were rumors of another abortive coup attempt. The July coup, however, came much closer to succeeding, and several of the highest officers were involved, including the head of the King's own military staff. Behind the extraordinary confusion of the immediate events* and the official story taken up by the foreign press—that the attempt was a response to corruption among the ministers, who remained basically loyal to the king—we find the national political crisis and the military urge to assume tutelage in the manner of the Algerians, the Egyptians, the Libyans, the Sudanis, and others. The possibility of covert American or French support for the coup is, of course, not to be ruled out.

Only thirteen months later, on August 16, 1972, elements of the air force attempted a dramatic assassination of the king. Three jets from the American base at Kenitra, piloted by Moroccans, nearly shot down the royal Boeing as it returned from France. The reported suicide of Defense Minister General Oufkir shortly afterwards, allegedly because of his implication in the plot, indicates how shaky the military base of the regime had become. For among a wavering officer corps, Oufkir was supposed to be the king's most loyal and ruthless defender. As the national crisis continues and the spirit of Arab nationalism grows, we may expect that the armed forces will not be immune from interventionist temptations again in the future.

The Regime's Search for New Strategies

As its economic and political development strategy of the 1960s failed and popular discontent grew, the regime and its foreign mentors began to search for new options with the turn into the 1970s. In the face of a quickening migration from the countryside to the city and the failure to establish a new middle-

* These events were fully reported in the press and consequently are not repeated here.

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peasant stratum, the question of the urban "problem" rose ever higher on the political agenda. Clearly, neither the agriculture-tourism axis of development policy nor the liberal dependence on foreign private capital, whatever the "incentives," was capable of responding to the catastrophic situation of the swelling urban masses. In addition, the continuing high proportion of foreign nationals in top posts and the clarity of the system of foreign ownership of the economy were a source of rising neo-nationalist opposition among the middle class and the national bourgeoisie. Both in Rabat planning circles and in the international financial circuit, there was increasing talk about the lessons to be drawn from the successes of the Algerian development program.

The first signs of a new government policy came in a royal speech in early 1970, several months before the new constitution, which promised the coming Moroccanization of the "tertiary sector," both in capital and in personnel, aimed at placating both the middle class and the national bourgeoisie. The French government attitude toward this move was in fact quite favorable. The French had become increasingly concerned about the political effect of so large a colony of French nationals in Morocco* and were keen to have it reduced, with provisions made for "just compensations" and the maintenance of French capital in control of key spheres of the economy, particularly banking.

The regime has been very slow to promulgate the promised new laws, however, presumably because of pressures from members of the French colony. For some types of activities, such as commercial representation of foreign products, companies are to be 51 percent Moroccan-owned, with boards of directors made up of at least two thirds Moroccans. There has been some panic and migration back to the metropole, but the biggest interests have had little to worry about. To adapt to the new conditions, new partnerships with Moroccans are being set up and other covers arranged so as to obscure some of the most blatant aspects of the neocolonial system.

Meanwhile, a new policy of urban development has been

* In 1970 this colony numbered roughly 100,000, down from some 400,000 before independence, but it is the largest French colony in the former possessions.

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announced, focusing on the crisis in urban housing, as tens of thousands of displaced peasants flock to the cities annually. This program, significantly enough, is to be carried out under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior. After a decade of rapidly rising urban rents, urban land speculation, and luxury apartment and villa construction, with only minimal government attention paid to the housing question, it is now proposed that major low-cost housing be constructed and other steps be taken to improve conditions in the vast *bidonvilles* of paper and tin shacks that surround every major city. The World Bank, having contributed to the problem with its agricultural loan policies, offered some housing-loan funds and has sent its latest team of experts to Rabat (January-February 1972) to study the question and make recommendations. But in view of the ever-deepening fiscal crisis of the state and the great magnitude of the housing shortage, it does not seem likely that this program will go beyond a few projects geared to the purposes of public relations.

There has also been increasing discussion of the need to emphasize industrial development in the future and to place industry among the top priorities of the next Five Year Plan (to begin in 1973). The long-postponed steel plant is again on the agenda as a state enterprise, and the planners are discussing other state industrial projects if private capital fails to materialize. But the dominant framework of the options is still liberal in character and the new emphasis does not propose any substantial structural change. Since Morocco lacks a significant internal market, any new industrial growth will have to be geared to exports to the Common Market zone and nearby African countries, as the Minister of Commerce and Industry recently pointed out.

A few new surface changes in policy followed the June 1971 coup. A royal speech several days later admitted that the regime was partly at fault for the discontent (recalling a similar speech after the riots of 1965) and promised "reforms." The reforms included some price reductions (among them, a reduction in the sensitive price of sugar); army and civil service pay was raised; a campaign against bureaucratic corruption was announced; and there was the usual cabinet shuffle.

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The king also made a renewed effort to coopt the National Bloc. Discussions with Bloc leaders were held throughout the fall and early winter over a revised form of parliamentarianism, in which the Bloc could agree to participate. The principal issues were: a new constitution with restricted powers for the king, an interim government with Bloc participation to supervise elections, and finally a new elected parliament. The outcome was predictable. The king announced unilaterally in mid-February the text of a new constitution to be put to a referendum in early March. The Bloc responded with a call to boycott; the Palace arranged yet another referendum victory, claiming 98.7 percent of the voters.

None of these maneuvers are capable of stemming the tide of change. In fact, a new and crucial element has been added in recent months to the Moroccan political struggle. An increasingly militant working class has engaged in several big strikes in spite of extremely repressive conditions. Big strikes of textile and shoe workers were followed in September 1971 by a two-and-a-half-month walkout at the state-owned phosphate mines at Khouribga. These mines, which yield the country's major export, have historically been a center of militant labor action and more will certainly be heard from them as political events develop. Meanwhile, neither the miners nor the other workers won more than minor concessions, and their strikes only indirectly posed larger political issues. But it seems that the Moroccan working class is beginning to move now, after nearly a decade of somnolence under a cautious social-democratic leadership.

Can the latest "reforms," aid packages, and programs by foreign experts keep the decrepit royal regime going much longer? It seems unlikely. In spite of royal maneuvers and ever-growing repression, the forces of change continue to grow in strength. If a new left leadership is prepared to act decisively and with principled revolutionary politics based solidly on the working class and the peasantry, the monarchically-based imperial "maintenance system" in Morocco can be replaced from the civilian side. If not, another nationalist faction of the army, perhaps with foreign encouragement, is likely to move onto the historical stage, creating in Morocco yet another variety of state capitalism under military tutelage.

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BLACK WOMEN IN REVOLT

This article, written by a group of black women, is part of a longer manuscript entitled "Lessons from the Damned," written by a group of young blacks in a northeastern suburban community. How it came to be written is explained in the introductory section which was specially prepared for MR.—The Editors

I

Since the Second World War, in the cities of the United States all strata of every ethnic group have been forced into housing projects by those of the ruling class who need their labor at a time of increased production and market demands. The United States was a new, rich, imperialist power. In the 1960s there were lots of crumbs for blacks, considered the dregs of the labor pool. We were able to move from one project complex to another on our way to the Promised Land, through middle-income housing and co-ops, trying to get as far away as possible from the lower-class project described below (upward-mobility, according to bourgeois social scientists).

The majority of lower-class project-dwellers are in the predicament of having absorbed the ideas and customs of the ruling class without having access to the capital that supports such ruling-class power. One of the main ideas of the ruling class is to get to the top by fair means or foul, do anything to stay there, and be sure everybody knows you're on top. The facts are that the only blacks who get anywhere near the top are *chosen* by the master because they have totally absorbed his

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ideas. They act not in their own working-class interest but in the master's. Of these, however, only a very few are chosen to be members of the white capitalist imperial court. They are blind to the fact that ruling bourgeois capitalists are aping the kings they overthrew in the 1700s. The capitalists strain to maintain the illusion that, even if they do not rule by Divine Right, God is in their corner. These descendants of petty traders have had a very short rule and already they are threatened by a revolution of the world-wide working class and peasantry. So many of the "black bourgeoisie" will be similarly threatened. But they are a very small group.

There seemed no way out of this illusion during the sixties. By 1970 some of us had grown up enough to see that the United States was declining in economic and political power internationally. Nationally, the master was forced to turn inward to suck the blood of its domestic labor force, white and black. For some, it was inflation but for us it was just a sea of unemployment. Nobody needed young black people.

By 1971 we could no longer struggle with all those external contradictions. They were just too heavy. Turning inward, we found even worse and more painful contradictions inside. To be honest, we were going mad.

We know now that the internal contradictions reflected the external contradictions. Out of this internal struggle that still continues we have found similar realities that seem necessary to the positive outcome of such an internal struggle. We saw that all of us were "the chosen child"—chosen to be the nigger of the family—the scapegoat and the oppressed one, necessary to the continual pursuit of illusions by the rest of the family. Culturally, black girls are less valued in this society, so we easily become the nigger of the family. In the case of black boys, it is the sensitive perceptive one—culturally the personification of feminine and the frightening opposite of "maleness."

No one seemed able to move forward in this internal struggle while directly under the siege of the family's oppression. We had to have a chance to be away from our parents. Everyone needed the upper-class luxury enjoyed at the expense of the working class—a little time and some quiet to think. For the women, we had to be away from other oppressive agents of the

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master, our men, and the bosses on the job. Welfare provided this material opportunity. For the men, many times it was prison. As oppressive as welfare and jail are, they give black people time to think.

In every case "the chosen one" had always stubbornly maintained acute perception—the capacity to see through to the core, despite the onslaught of illusions. It is the way of the very small child. At the same time, they were still open enough to hear when they were thrown into contact with others like them. The others were invariably niggers, oppressed people, but they had through practice and experience formed and learned a structure that began to explain their oppression. They were not lonely and powerless individuals any more. This reflection was what we needed to confirm the primitive (primary) knowledge that it is right and just to resist, to defend yourself, and finally to overthrow those who have oppressed you, from parents full of illusions to a capitalist system built on them and the illusions. For the first time "the chosen ones" could experience a sense of power recaptured. We really began to feel we could win.

But now we know even more. Into this fertile soil must come a clear and precise pattern of reality. For us it has been those scientific principles of the dialectical movement of material forces laid out for us by Marx, Lenin, and Mao Tse-tung. They allowed us to see the whole world historically and objectively—inside and out. This awareness has gone down very deep, like indestructible roots. Out of this depth have come action and experience, some of which is exemplified below.

There has been constant struggle within ourselves and now outside ourselves, disciplined and undisciplined, learning from experience, slipping back but never all the way, applying Marxism-Leninism and finding our experience proven in that theory itself. Finally, and despite the poverty of bourgeois education for poor blacks, we have been able to describe it in order to teach others.

Present objective conditions do not allow the decisive acts to overthrow a capitalist system still strong with illusions. People make up a system, and U.S. citizens still have too many illusions. We are only a few—and in this instance poor black

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females—who have been able to see some of the vast dialectical forces which caused the killing internal pain of millions like us. This agony will increase the energy needed to break this murderous system. But it must have form and discipline eventually. It has to become knowledge that oppressed people have to take responsibility for their own oppression if socialism is to become a reality.

We have tried to speak in the name of countless others who are not permitted the privilege. Please let our individual names pass away and be forgotten with all the nameless like us—and those too who went before and yet in reality made it possible for us to speak today.

II

Those of us who were born and have lived in the projects all our lives are the failures of the system. We didn't get those single-family homes everyone was hustling for since 1948. Most of us black women were born from 1948 on down to the early fifties. We have seen "striving poor" black families move out and sharecropper families from the South move in, or black families without fathers. All of our families had fathers. Most of these new families didn't, or the men moved in and out and weren't the fathers of the children.

The projects always needed repairs from the beginning and we children had too much energy to be cooped up in high-rise apartments with an elevator. We wanted to get out fast, so we always took the stairs. We wanted to run, free ourselves. The pressures were bad. But we didn't know this in our heads. We just felt the urge and we acted. All the families were like this. There was always gossip, each family moving on the other, outdoing the other, the kids fighting and playing. The games were "down and dirty."

Our mothers still dream of having their own house. Many families are still struggling to get out. You see, in the beginning we knew no low-class folks were let into the projects. If you weren't married you couldn't get in. If you had a baby out of wedlock, you got put out. There's one among us who had some bitter memories about that. Later, when welfare pushed and

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the housing shortage for poor blacks got worse, her mother and the kids got back in. But while they were out, they lived four to one room, and they got burned out twice. In that time the mother felt forced to give one of her babies away to relatives down South. This is not an individual story. It's happened to lots of us.

Our fathers were mostly veterans of the Second World War. If they couldn't get to college, at least they got good-paying jobs as skilled factory workers, especially during the Korean War. A lot of our mothers worked, mostly in domestic service, and a few had low-paid typist jobs. Some worked in the local hospitals as clean-up women and a very few as nurse's aides. Our fathers made the most money, and no one ever questioned why this was. It was accepted that our mothers worked to help save for the house. They would get paid less since daddies were supposed to make more money. That was the American Way. Daddies were supermen, not mommies.

Our fathers could really "rap"! They didn't fly through the sky like whitey, but they bopped and glided along the pavements, and in the bars they were kings. Around 1955-1956 our daddies started swilling liquor, drinking real bad and just about making it home, on their knees. We black women children didn't know, nor did anyone tell us, that black men were losing jobs or being offered jobs of lower status, like in shipping or packing. This was downgrading and the beginning of one of those economic slumps you can read about in the *Wall Street Journal* but never hear about in school. No one told us jobs had to be automated so the factory owners could produce more cheaply. Like when some of us came from down South, it was because machines could do our jobs for less money than the boss paid us.

Our "pops" were "much talk and no action"! We loved them very much as young teenage black women. We cannot make the intensity of this love for our daddies so's you can touch it unless you have lived the way we did. As they drank more, they beat momma more and she turned on us. Daddy now stayed away for days and you'd see him on the corner "moving on some 'bitch.' " But he still came home occasionally, and he brought "him some money" part of the time. But the

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arguments between him and "moms" got brutal. Our momma didn't understand that he'd lost his job because the system—capitalism—didn't need him. She blamed the loss of the job on him. He blamed the loss of the job on her.

We were left with half-fathers or none at all. Too many of us have spent our teenage life looking for another daddy, and the security we learned went with having daddies. This is our basic history—loss of security and loss of our daddies. It made everyone of us dependent on males economically and psychologically. We can put this together now, but then there was ABSOLUTELY NOBODY to "hip" us to what was really happening and how everything was connected.

The fighting between our parents and between our brothers and sisters spread and worsened. Each of us saw our own individual problems as bigger and more important than anybody else's. We never looked back on ourselves. We always blamed the problem on someone close to us. That's as far as we could see. Families moved on families, and our older brothers, the favorites of the parents, slowly began to "trip out" on "smack" (dope). Now everybody was fighting everybody else, and none of us ever considered it had anything to do with big capitalism and imperialism and neocolonialism. We would have laughed at the words. They were too damn big, and we had never heard them in school. We lived from one day to the next, with no past and no future. So fighting among ourselves and "tripping" on a little "smokes," a little wine, was a release. We talk about the old days now and fall out laughing. To some of us who laugh the hardest, the memories are still too painful because we are still caught on the system. We can still phantasize about "being somebody" or having this dress or this piece of furniture. But we know the power is in us basically because we *cannot* want those things if we really decide. Ain't nobody got the power outside of us. We have it inside! TALKING about this and the old days is a replay, like it's a way to get it out of our system because even with political consciousness, we are still trapped—and everybody is getting poorer.

There was just "no way" for our world to be broken into and made real by connecting it to the economic system we lived in, which we now know as capitalism. Each apartment was a

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separate world. Each individual in the family was a separate world. The very word *apartment* describes the reality of apartness. Each member of the family lived for that day or, better said, each of us lived to get to Friday when we could party and get ourself a boyfriend. We were successfully cut off from each other and the world around us.

When the world moved, it moved on us separately and we dealt with that attack separately. Because we admired that world, depended on it for all our necessities like food, clothing, water, housing, education, and the "goodies," like fancy clothes and pretty furniture—yet we were constantly "put down" by it. We were caught in a bind we couldn't get out of. Lord! How we loved "fine" clothes! But when we stole them, the clothes were taken away and sometimes we were put away. When we tried to get jobs with "big money" to buy those pretty things, we were only allowed little petty jobs with low pay. If we studied hard and got good marks so we could go to college, there was no money. Our parents were too poor.

All during the late fifties and early sixties, every move outward to join the white world was stopped cold. But the first problem was in us. We wanted that world BAD! It didn't need us or want us young black women, except as domestics, clean-up personnel in some institution, pool secretaries, waitresses, and five-and-dime store clerks. The second problem was, we didn't understand why we couldn't have it. And the third problem was, at this critical time—early sixties—no one came to patiently explain anything to us.

But now we have gone back, ourselves, to our mothers and fathers and made them tell us about their past. We've forced them to the wall many times in the last four years, making them tell us things they had learned to be ashamed of—mostly low social status. But we have put together a picture of Southern poor black women pulling together to get North. Some of the stories are exciting, like when the Ku Klux Klan attacked in North Carolina and some of the women determined to get out because the terror was too much. Others were plain and simple stories of never having enough, shacks built by the family itself on somebody else's land, no work, little income, family quarrels, and boyfriends who had already gone North leav-

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ing pregnant young women behind. Many of those babies were born and were left in the South with "granma." The young mother followed her man North, got a job and sent money home for the children. The young father had long ago just disappeared. A new man came along and there were children born here. But there was no fit place for the children to play, no one to help take care of them, and the man wanted to "play." So these children went South to be raised in the country away from the bad city.

Many of our mothers followed their older sisters up, where the first job was almost always in domestic service. They'd live together in one of the Big City slums and commute to the suburbs by bus and train. Some would sleep-in at first, save their money, get an apartment and send for other sisters, aunts, or cousins. They'd work in domestic service for years, saving their money and helping to support families, their own children down South and their nieces and nephews. Sometimes they'd save up enough to buy an old house and rent out rooms to other black women who had just come North and were domestics and wanted the privacy of their own room on their day off. This income, along with the income from renting rooms to single men doing factory work, helped to pay for the house. Most of our parents wanted to forget this past.

Our parents have always looked up and onward. This was the American Way of Life. Now here they were, living right next door, almost, to the American Dream, the rich whites. They had made it out of the South, out of the big Northern city slum into the slums of suburbia—just one more step—just one more step and they could be out of the slums entirely. So close—so damned close, and yet so far, so far away! Greedy hogs skewered to a spike, prepared for slaughter. Anytime, they could lose their jobs—twisting, turning, trying to get loose. No Way!

The word "pigs" is really a placing of our own contradictions outside of ourselves. We put the term "pigs" on the white cops who come from the same class we do, only they are white-skinned petty bourgeois. They, therefore, are more privileged. But they have the same kind of frustrations we have. They, too, are so close to the "goodies" but still so far away.

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Now you take the nigger cops in our town. They all come from out of the projects, and their families look down on us still trapped inside the projects. We look down on the families around the projects who can't get in. When we were kids together, we sniggered and made fun of those just up from the South.

There is a saying kids have. "Takes one to know one!" When we started calling cops "pigs" and black-skinned cops "nigger pigs," it took a pig to know a pig. It would have been more honest of us if we had recognized that the cops and we are greedy, hungry, and eager for the "goodies" of the middle-class. We both are caught between having and not having.

In the early sixties, the projects finally blew wide open. The evening was hot. Everybody was hanging-out, grouped around the benches, sitting on the fences, laying out on the grass, sharing a bottle in the ball field. A white cop beat "the blood" to the ground, right in plain sight of everyone. Just getting his "balls off" on "the nigger" "'cause he's a nigger! Niggers are disgusting anyhow! You know how lazy they are. . . . They've got real hateful lately! . . . Besides they're scary!" Fear and anger, all knotted up together. "Hit that son-of-a-bitch!" The women moved first, covering their sons with their own bodies, screaming at the cop, cursing and moving toward him. The black men stood "stock-still"—watching, tense, rigid, unmoving.

The next day the entire project marched on City Hall. Never had there been such a spontaneous collective action. But never had a people experienced such long-lasting, razor-sharp frustration—living so near to the finer things, yet so far away from "them goodies." This reality had been building up since the early fifties. Other cities began to blow. "Burn that motherfucker down! . . . Here, sister, take these clothes home to yo' kids! Man, gimme that bottle of gin, you know I don't dig J&B! . . . Hey, get that color TV over there! Get the kids out. The place is going up! Oh lordy me, what am I gonna do now? I ain't got no place to go!" Everybody black suffering the same contradiction, like a knife in the stomach. We had gotten to the North, made it to the Promised Land, and everything was slipping through our fingers. It was steady getting worse and there weren't no other place to go.

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The anger subsided. The court case went on and on, put off and postponed, like this would tire us out. We were already empty. Our fury had spent itself. We went back "scratching for bread" and "louding" each other.

But not all of us. We younger black women hung in there for the "brother" who got his head cracked open. The white lawyer took the case for nothing. He was mad! And with the young black women's help and the pushing of the mother, they won a legal victory.

Some of the young black sisters over at the high school moved on the shit the teachers have always handed out. The brothers, too, were moving on racism. We got ourself a group going—black brothers and sisters, raised fists, blue jeans, khaki jackets, cool—we were moving. But the brothers wanted us to walk behind them. They started giving orders for us to walk between them when we went down to the Big City to liberate books on politics. They had to protect us. Where were they coming from? Black women never got no protection from nobody. We could fight as good as any man. Black brothers told us it was time to "get back" and let them lead.

Manhood was privilege—to be "somebody," at least and at last, over black women and children. Ain't that a bitch? Acting just like Mr. Whiteman over his women and children. Was this a revolution or were we exchanging one master for another? No bet! No matter how "the bloods" tried to dress this shit up in political terms, it was plain—they were playing the master and we were to play the slaves.

Play-acting didn't really make any difference, but when we graduated, we learned that women's inferiority was real and deadly. We got training jobs in the office pool. The "bloods" were on the production lines and pulling in more an hour than we were. The economic oppression for us was still as real as it had been for our black mothers. We either took those minor office jobs, or went back to "momma's" job at "Miss Anne's," or into the hospital scrubbing floors or carrying meal trays.

A very small number of us got scholarships at the local colleges. We tried our "bad-all-black-shit" there, staying to ourselves, dressing like revolutionaries. We black women were play-acting and being educated by the system. We were off the job

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market that was getting smaller, particularly for black women, and being allowed by the college administration to strut our "black power" shit as long as we didn't go too far. We were going to get that education and take it back to the people. Now in college we were getting the same lies the poor people were choking on in high school. They knew we were bullshitting. We had privilege and didn't want to admit it.

Those of us who got neither on-the-job-training nor a college scholarship got ourselves pregnant. We didn't really mind because it would make us dependent on men, and we liked that no matter what the political sisters said. For too many years black women had had to carry the whole load of the family without a man. Poor black women who lived outside of the projects reminded us that poor women all over the world had to keep the family going because their men were sent away when the Europeans and Americans colonized their land. Men were sent to the West as slaves, or they became migrant laborers in other parts of Africa and later Europe. When they revolted against the colonial system, they were sent to prison or killed. Thousands of Asian men became the crews of trading ships, leaving their families for years. In South Africa today, black African men are forced into the mines to pay taxes put on them by the white occupiers. They have to leave their children and their women for six months to a year. Black men ran away from the constant economic and psychological harassment in the South. South American males travelled to the big cities for work to feed their families. All poor families have had their men ripped from them by colonialism, capitalism, and imperialism.

We petty-bourgeois women, at least, did not suffer from our men being driven from the home in quite the same way. They could get low-paying jobs under capitalism. But since the middle-sixties, our men have lost jobs, gone on dope, or been sent to jail for felonies. We project women have competed like crabs in a barrel for a "blood" with a job. Not a human being, AN OBJECT and a means to get the "loot." Like our brothers, we are hooked, but not on "scag." We are hooked on the "goodies" and on men who can provide the "bread" to get the "goodies."

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We were and are the most "tripped out" on clothes and furniture. Unless you've lived in a low-income project, you can't feel what it is like to have to drop everything, go downtown, and buy and buy and buy. We'd take EVERYTHING in sight if we could. If we run out of money, we come back home evil, with "an attitude," snap at anybody in a minute—our head aching with the tension, with the rage, our stomach tied in knots with fury! Goddamn it!

To see our kids the best dressed in the projects, five pairs of shoes for one child—o—o—h, that's a good feeling! But still we live in a dirty, crowded project. So near and yet so far away.

To see "our man" "bop" down the project path, every woman's head turned toward him—and he's all ours! How they envy us because he's so fine and he belongs to "this woman"! Back in the apartment, he's uptight because we spent the food money on clothes. He "gets an attitude" because we don't have supper ready and the dishes are still in the sink this morning. He says we don't care about him. "Black women ain't shit!"—so near and so far away.

"Being in love with the master and the 'goodies' makes you very empty. It drives you into fantasy and dreams. I can dream I am in this place or that place. I can't read when I'm like this. I can't concentrate. I look at TV. It romanticizes me!" You have to have been in this predicament to know how difficult it is to come out of it with nothing waiting for you but political struggle with other women who are just like you were. They do everything not to hear you. But they know, like we knew, deep down. They just can't bear to know just yet.

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BOOKS

HOW CAN MEN STAND UP?

BY KEITH BUCHANAN

The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China, by Mark Selden. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971. 371 pp. $10; paperback, $3.50.

This study is concerned, in Mark Selden's own words, with "the central problem of our time." It is a problem which, nonetheless, does not greatly preoccupy press or radio commentators in the overdeveloped societies; it has nothing to do with currency chaos or disintegrating societies evocative of the final stages of the Roman Empire—it is concerned simply and directly with "how men stand up," with how they can break the shackles of poverty and oppression. And the story Mark Selden has to tell is a story which, if its lessons are rightly learned, will be repeated again and again before our children are our age, for it is the story of how the damned and disinherited who dwell in the great belt of rural slums which make up the "underdeveloped" countries "can defeat the bearers of advanced technology and ruthless weaponry, the architects of empire." And it is the story of how, in this struggle, man not only liberates himself physically but also spiritually; of how, in the midst of the ravages of counter-revolutionary war and foreign invasions, a new and exalted concept of man

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Keith Buchanan, a frequent contributor to MONTHLY REVIEW, teaches geography at Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand. His latest book is *Transformation of the Chinese Earth: Aspects of the Evolution of the Chinese Earth from Earliest Times to Mao Tse-tung* (New York: Praeger, 1970).

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and of society is hammered out. Such possibilities are what Mao Tse-tung has in mind when he speaks of "an immensely powerful spiritual atomic bomb"; and, indeed, the challenge of China to the nations of the white north, capitalist or communist, is not posed at the crude physical level of nuclear weaponry or massed manpower but at the infinitely more dangerous spiritual level. For the "Yenan Way" charts a new—and uplifting—path of human development, so that, as Kazuhiko Sumoya underlines, the thought of Mao Tse-tung must be regarded as a gigantic "switch-lever of history," paralleled only by the Mosaic Law, which followed upon an earlier Long March.

In dissecting the events which, in the late 1930s and early 1940s, changed the face of East Asia, Selden lays bare the inner dynamic of people's war; this is "not merely a way of fighting but a way of life [which] embodies a vision of man and society and an approach to development built on foundations of popular participation and egalitarian values." In fighting for their lives, and for the lives and the futures of their families and their fellows, men are engaged also in a conscious process of "actively redefining those lives." And if we seek an explanation for the greatest human epic of our time—the story of how a peasant people, with millet, a handful of weapons, and an unflinching belief in human dignity, changed the course of history—we will find it in this process of popular involvement in war, revolution, politics, and economic change that was hammered out, first in the Kiangsi base, then with increasing confidence and skill in the Shen-Kan-Ning base of northwest China. For it was a process of involvement that pulled in the forgotten men and women in the fields and factories and on the war fronts, and showed them how they might be the makers of history and that it was they, and they alone, who would determine the shape of their future. One of the most memorable themes in the volume is Selden's account of the long, infinitely patient, and skilful programs by which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) brought about this psychological liberation which (contrary to Western legends) was achieved without that participation in the violent destruction of the oppressor which the Fanon *schema* postulates.

The lessons of these years, Selden claims, are relevant not only to the impoverished nations of the Third World but "to men and women everywhere who seek to create a society free from stifling oppression, arbitrary state power, and enslaving technology." This reviewer would agree. Development in the south might become a reality, overdevelopment in the white north might

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be less destructive if, as Denis Goulet suggests, *austerity* in the developing nations were matched by *frugality* in the developed nations. Arbitrary and oppressive state power, in the developed and underdeveloped societies alike, reduces the great mass of citizens to impotent prisoners within "a culture of silence." Technology is no longer the means to a more human existence but is perverted by those preoccupied with keeping their profit rates up and the great majority of humankind down. But just how the sickness of the overdeveloped world can be cured by the lessons of Yenan is a separate issue—and cannot be confronted in a review of this length. What is important here is that these lessons provided the basis for the CCP's success in 1949 and, carried by the PLA from their original cradle area in one of the most impoverished regions of a desperately poor country, provide a generation later the inspiration and the model for the ongoing transformation of China's physical and psychological landscapes. And one reason for the appeal of the "Yenan Way" lies, as Selden shows, in the fact that its conceptual basis is a Marxism deeply rooted in the concrete realities of China, rooted especially in the countryside where the main attack on poverty, oppression, and stagnation had to be mounted. And for this reviewer, interested in the processes of change in rural China, some of Selden's most fascinating pages are those in which he demonstrates the deep roots in Chinese history of some of the changes now taking place—that many of the social and economic programs we associate with the Cultural Revolution or its aftermath had been tested out in the Border Region in the early forties; that the "red" versus "expert" conflict emerged in an acute form in 1943; that the participation of the military in agricultural and industrial production goes back not simply to the work of the 359th Brigade at Nan-ni-wan in 1938 but that the model for those initial experiments was drawn, as Mao Tse-tung himself makes clear, from the *t'un-t'ien* or "camp-field" system of frontier military colonies developed under the Han dynasty two millennia ago. As Robert Payne has said, in a perceptive comment on continuity in Chinese poetry: "From the earliest times to the present day, the same themes are repeated, the same images reappear, the same metal is hammered into shape." And in the political field we can regard Mao's report at the Sixth Plenum, thirty years ago, as the outstanding example of the thinking which makes possible this sort of continuity. Said Mao:

> A Communist is a Marxist internationalist but Marxism must take on a national form before it can be applied. There is no such thing as abstract Marxism, but only concrete Marxism. . . .

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If a Chinese Communist who is a part of the great Chinese people, bound to his people by his very flesh and blood, talks of Marxism apart from Chinese peculiarities, this Marxism is merely an empty abstraction. The Sinification of Marxism . . . becomes a problem that must be understood and solved by the whole party without delay. . . . We must put an end to writing eight-legged essays on foreign models.

A successful policy not only builds on what is best in the past but must be rooted in the concrete realities—and regional nuances—of local conditions. And the success of the Chinese development model, which contrasts so strikingly with the failure of those "modernizing elites" so dear to Western development planners, who dominate the "development" process in much of the Third World, can be attributed largely to the fact that from 1943 onward "the party . . . drew its primary inspirations and models not from the industrialized West but from the most creative elements of the Chinese peasantry," and from the fact that the Yenan Way is, as Selden emphasizes, *an integrated program,* involving

a distinctive approach to economic development, social transformation, and people's war. . . . Unequivocally rejecting domination by an administrative or technical elite operating through a centralized bureaucracy, it emphasized popular participation, decentralization, and community power. Underlying this approach was a conception of human nature which held that men, all men, could transcend limitations of class, experience, and ideology to act creatively in building a new China.

Revolution from above, it was recognized, could not lead a peasant nation into the modern world, could not overcome the major barriers to development which were, as Mao correctly diagnosed, essentially structural. And it was not sufficient merely to demolish these barriers, for if the full productive power of the peasant masses was to be unleashed, a change from individual to collective labor was essential. And this implied not the sort of cooperative which had prevailed to that time and which had taken shape as a result of pressures from above but a cooperative based on committed local leadership and enthusiastic peasant support.

The conclusions to be drawn from earlier experiments in this field were astutely analyzed by Mao in his report on "Economic and Financial Problems" delivered at the Senior Cadres Conference in December 1942. This report, in Selden's view,

represents a milestone in the development of Mao's analysis of the problems of the transformation of rural society and his fullest

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statement on economic development. Containing a perceptive assessment of the relevance and limitations of traditional methods of mutual aid vis-à-vis regional socio-economic problems, it provided the analytical basis for the cooperative movement, the heart of the party's new approach to the peasantry.

And the subsequent development of mutual aid reflects the party's sound grasp of the region's economic problems, conveying, too, something of "the excitement of men who have grasped a bold new vision of society"—and who are confident this vision can be realized. It was the vision of men who sought not merely to end exploitation and underdevelopment but who saw that in the process of ending these things the peasant could be brought into a nation-state and a new society. It is one of the greatest merits of Selden's volume that by careful and skilful use of the great mass of Chinese-language material dealing with these changes (especially material published at the time in the Shen-Kan-Ning region) he communicates to the reader the excitement—and the patience and dedication—of those who had glimpsed this new vision and who, amid the chaos of civil war and invasion, laid the foundations of a new and alternative society.

How well these fighters and theoreticians of the CCP built is illustrated again and again in the last two chapters of Selden's volume. Here, in some 70 pages of masterly compressed writing, Selden demonstrates the continuity between these increasingly confident programs of social and economic development in the Border Region and the nation-wide programs initiated and elaborated after 1949 (and especially after 1966). The cooperatives and mutual aid teams provided effective popular structures for the group organization of the economic, social, political, and military life of the community; they led through directly to the communes of a quarter of a century later—and, like guerrilla war, their success is dependent on "the initiative, dedication, and skill of autonomous groups." The 1958 steel-making campaign, dismissed by Western experts as a costly failure, is paralleled by the efforts in the early forties to develop the potential of home industries: both programs went beyond conventional economics, aiming at drawing in non-producers even if their productivity proved low, at decentralizing industry and bringing it to the people, and above all at shattering "the psychological barrier of peasant fatalism." The self-reliance and self-sufficiency, which the post-1949 quarantining and armed containment of People's China made necessary, drew heavily on the Party's experiences during the

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blockade of the Border Region by the Japanese and Kuomintang. The integration of cadres and of the Peoples Liberation Army into productive work, the emancipation of women, these were all pioneered during the Yenan Period. But perhaps most important of all was the transformation of the education system, for education in China before Liberation, as in much of the Third World today, was a critical element in the whole process of domination by a small and privileged elite. The *cheng-feng* (cadre training and rectification) campaign of 1942, however, showed that "culture and education must and could be generated and controlled by the people themselves, operating through effective community channels."

It is on this awareness, born of struggle and infinite patience and informed by an exalted—yet realistic—concept of human potentialities that the rich and liberating educational developments of China today are based. What emerged was a participatory education in which "learning and doing were united, and educational responsibility was shared by students, teachers, and the community." It was an education system which emphasized *service,* which took as its point of departure the "*concept* of how to serve the people" and passed logically to the *skills* necessary to implement this concept. In retrospect all these things seem so simple and so obvious, yet full understanding of the realities Selden so lucidly dissects continues to elude many of the Establishment's most venerated China-watchers, as it continues to elude the client elites of the Third World.

Political, economic, and social changes led to a new concept of the relationship between leaders and people in the new society, as expressed in "the mass line." This was most clearly defined by the Politburo resolution of June 1943, on "The Methods of Leadership":

> Correct leadership can only be developed on the principle of "from the masses, to the masses." . . . The basic method of leadership is to sum up the views of the masses, take the results back to the masses so that the masses can give them their firm support and so work out sound ideas for leading the work on hand.

At a time when, in developed and "underdeveloped" societies alike, elitism, political inarticulateness, and calculated exploitation of this inarticulateness are the dominant elements of the political scene, the Chinese have gone far towards developing an alternative system. It is a system which involves the whole popu-

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lation in policy-forming; which involves a continuous process of political education that alone can overcome fear of change, fear of all forms of government; which, for perhaps the first time in history, is making possible the liberation of man's full potential. In Mark Selden, the events of the Yenan Period, the ideas which are shaping contemporary China and which will help shape the whole course of future history, find a worthy chronicler; indeed, *The Yenan Way* must be set alongside the studies of Jack Belden and Edgar Snow, of William Hinton and Jan Myrdal, among that very small handful of studies fundamental to an understanding of China today.

Many men still believe a woman is an aspirin—she lives just to relieve his headaches from the system. She is supposed to clean his house, take care of his kids, fuck on command, get a job when he needs extra money, go back to the house when there is work to be done there. . . . He describes her as a nagging, stupid bitch, an ungrateful bundle of hysterical emotions. He says she is worthless in the struggle against the system. "Man, I'd never take a broad to do a job; they crack up under pressure." We think that whole image of women is a lie, a lie men tell to themselves to justify oppressing another person. The revolution has no use for the low men on the totem pole acting like screws [prison guards] to their wives, mothers, girlfriends, and kids, too. We understand a lot of its roots. The system makes us feel like dirt, and we learn in school and the movies and TV that the way to be big is to push other people around. . . . We must stop lying to ourselves, stop hating other oppressed people who we need to build the movement with. Many times women have tried to love us, but because we hate ourselves so bad and feel so weak against the system, we take everything out on them. The sisters are making it clear they will no longer put up with this bullshit. Some of them just don't want to work with men, period. They feel men are hopeless, a bunch of little napoleons walking around with bruised egos, always needing everybody to agree with them and tell them how big and bad they are. Many sisters are willing to work with men, but only if we are really willing to change. They will work with us as full members or not at all. They will develop strategy and carry it out, not sit quietly waiting to find out what the men have planned for them. As the struggle intensifies they will be there helping to lead the assault. . . . We want to work with our brothers a lot. But they must understand that the people's revolution will involve many welfare mothers, women factory workers, women ex-prisoners, secretaries, nurses, women working at housework and rearing children, and these sisters will not tolerate being pushed around by men.

—Declaration of the Red Prison Movement, Appendix to *Comrade George,* by Eric Mann

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(*Continued from inside back cover*)

to time to publish a selection of letters or excerpts from letters. Meanwhile, let us call attention to points made in two recently received letters.

(1) A Puerto Rican, writing from an Illinois prison, reminds us that owing to "the deprived education of the imperialist parasites," he and many other prisoners often have difficulty reading radical literature, and asks writers (including the editors of MR) to remember whom they are trying to communicate with, to give "simple examples to make clear specific and important points," and not to "use words and phrases which the masses of people cannot understand." The advice is relevant and timely, and we (and we hope all others who write for MR) will try to take it to heart. At the same time it should not be overlooked that there is another side to the coin: much of the knowledge and many of the ideas needed in an effective revolutionary movement are not easy to grasp and cannot be oversimplified without risk of serious distortion. While all unnecessary jargon and obscurantism should be ruthlessly eliminated, problems of understanding and interpretation will always remain and should be treated by the reader as a challenge to thought and self-education.

(2) Another prisoner, reporting on the failure of a planned study group to materialize, expresses the view that radicals and revolutionaries in his area have not supported prisoner needs as well as liberal psychologists, sociologists, etc. He concludes that until the radicals do better, "prisoners are going to continue to adhere to the ideology of those who express their needs—the liberals at this time." Sending books and other kinds of literature is necessary, "but since conditions do make it possible, I think that the people 'out there' should come inside the prison to rap to prisoners on an individual basis, also on a group basis. And it is definitely necessary for the revolutionary organizations to try and guide and control the prison reform movement. It seems that the liberals are doing all of the above, and the revolutionaries none—at least around here."

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